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Abstract  
This paper presents both theoretical analysis and econometric evidence for the United States, Great 
Britain and Norway on the extent to which hourly wages of different groups of workers are 
sensitive to local labour market conditions. We focus on differences by union status. Our 
theoretical framework captures both a turnover-based efficiency wage mechanism and one 
originating in union-firm bargaining. Under fairly general conditions, we show that wages are less 
sensitive to local unemployment the higher is the bargaining power of the union. In accordance 
with this theoretical prediction, we find that the absolute value of the elasticity of wages with 
respect to unemployment is higher in the nonunion sector than in the union sector for all three 
countries. We interpret the evidence as giving support to an efficiency wage interpretation of the 
wage curve. 
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1. Introduction 
The effect of local unemployment on pay determination has become the focus of substantial 
analysis, particularly with the publication of The Wage Curve by Blanchflower and Oswald 
(1994). It is not surprising that this should be so, as real wage flexibility plays a crucial role in 
determining how economies adjust to adverse shocks. The extent to which wages fall in 
response to increasing unemployment is a crucial determinant of the magnitude and persistence 
of the impact of labour demand or supply-side shocks (see, for example, Layard et al. (1991) or 
Blanchard and Katz (1997)). Furthermore, as Card (1995) has observed, a wage curve 
interpreted as an equilibrium relationship between wages and unemployment  that is, a quasi-
supply function for labour - is a key potential element in the construction of an aggregate 
labour market model when combined with a simple labour demand schedule. 
The central and surprising finding reported by Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) 
concerns the remarkable uniformity across countries in the estimated elasticities of earnings 
with respect to unemployment. The estimates imply that a rise in unemployment of ten percent 
will lead to a one percent fall in wages in almost all countries, regardless of differences across 
countries in factors such as institutional arrangements. This is particularly surprising in the 
context of cross-country studies suggesting that the levels of centralisation and coordination in 
wage bargaining do exert an influence on macroeconomic performance (see, for example, 
Calmfors and Driffill (1988) and Layard et al. (1991)) and the wage distribution, Blau and 
Kahn (1996). Moreover, consistent with this evidence on the importance of institutional 
arrangements is the finding reported by Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) that the estimated 
responsiveness of wages to unemployment seems to vary across union and nonunion workers. 
This issue of differences by union status in the elasticity of the wage curve is the focus of our 
paper. 
There are three main motivations for our focus on union/nonunion differences in the 
elasticity of wages with respect to unemployment. Our first motivation is empirical and 
concerns the issue of how robust is the observation that the impact of local labour market 
conditions varies across union and nonunion workers. Our second motivation is policy-related. 
There is currently a significant debate on the role and relevance of trade unions in Europe (see, 
for example, Boeri et al. (2001)). In an important sense, the process of convergence toward 
European monetary unification has placed renewed emphasis on the role of unions as a 
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mechanism for national wage coordination. The future role of unions at both the micro and the 
macro level is likely to be shaped significantly by policies of the European Union and it is 
important that the policy debate is informed by research evidence on the effects of unions on 
labour market outcomes.  
Our third motivation is theoretical: we are interested in what the empirical evidence can 
tell us about the theoretical micro-foundations of the wage curve. Card (1995) argues that 
readers of Blanchflower and Oswald (1994), . . . will find the efficiency wage model a leading 
contender for explaining the wage curve, yet . . . with no real evidence in favour of the model . 
. .  and suggests that more thought should be given to developing the implications of an 
efficiency wage model for differences in the slope of the wage curve across different groups of 
workers. In the current paper, we pursue this suggestion by developing an efficiency wage 
model of the wage curve in which we incorporate wage bargaining between firms and unions. 
Other models have integrated bargaining and efficiency wages (see, for example Hoel, 1989 
and Rødseth, 1992), but these do not focus on how wages respond to variations in 
unemployment. The innovation in our model is that the wage curve we derive has two 
independent sources: it can be derived either from the efficiency wage mechanism, which we 
specify, or as a result of wage bargaining, or from the combination of the two. In other words, 
we combine in a single model both the efficiency wage (EW) and the wage bargaining (WB) 
micro-foundations of the wage curve, where Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) considered these 
as separate and unrelated models potentially underpinning the wage curve. 
 Our approach enables us to investigate how the predictions of the EW model vary 
across union and nonunion sectors, whilst allowing for an independent influence of unions on 
the wage curve elasticity. This last point is important empirically. As Card (1995) points out, 
the bargaining model does not offer a convincing explanation of the wage curve in countries, 
like the United States, in which unionisation is low. Furthermore, if wages are insensitive to 
local labour market conditions in the union sector, where bargaining determines the outcome, it 
is difficult to imagine that the average wage curve of the economy can result from the impact 
of local unemployment on bargaining outcomes. Moreover, if wage curves differ between the 
union and the nonunion sectors, we have a simple explanation for why wages tend to be less 
sensitive to local labour market conditions in countries with high union density and powerful 
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unions. Of course, high union density tends to go hand in hand with more centralised wage 
setting with wages responding to changes in aggregate, rather than local, unemployment.  
In countries with a strong tradition of wage bargaining there may be both EW and WB 
mechanisms operating to shape any resulting wage curve. Our theoretical framework nests the 
two explanations and allows us to make predictions regarding possible differences in wage 
curves across union and nonunion sectors even when efficiency wage characteristics are 
common to both sectors. We know of no reason to suppose that EW mechanisms characterise 
the nonunion sector only. As we show in section 3 of the paper, our framework suggests that 
wages are likely to be less sensitive to local unemployment the higher is the bargaining power 
of the union. This is the main prediction we address in our empirical analysis, where we 
investigate the slope of the wage curve - that is, the unemployment elasticity of wages - in 3 
countries: the United States, Great Britain and Norway. We also develop a number of 
hypotheses and predictions in an attempt to discriminate between EW and WB models of the 
wage curve.  
The rest of this paper is organised as follows.  In the next section, we review the 
existing empirical evidence on wage curves in union and nonunion sectors.  In section 3, we 
draw on the efficiency wage model of Campbell and Orszag (1998) and build a theoretical 
model in which bargaining power generates rent-sharing and local labour market conditions 
affect wage outcomes both via turnover costs and via conflict payoffs.  The core empirical 
analyses are described and presented in sections 4 and 5. In section 6, we examine whether the 
relationship between wages and unemployment is better described by a Phillips curve than by a 
wage curve, and in section 7 we address the robustness of empirical results in subsamples of 
young and old workers. Section 8 concludes.  
 
2. Empirical evidence on union and nonunion wages curves 
During the last decade, numerous empirical studies from various countries have estimated the 
relationship between local labour market conditions, typically unemployment, and the wage 
level (see Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994).  The empirical evidence seems to identify a 
negative relationship between wages and contemporaneous local unemployment, and the idea 
of an empirical law of an elasticity of earnings with respect to local unemployment of around 
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0.1, suggested by Blanchflower and Oswald, seems to be widely accepted (Card, 1995).  
However, when the wage curve is examined separately for different groups of workers, the 
empirical pattern is one of large differences in wage curve elasticities across groups (Card, 
1995; Baltagi and Blien, 1998; Turunen, 1998).  Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) themselves 
report a distinctly different slope for the wage curve in the union and nonunion sectors.  
Table 1 summarises estimates of the elasticity of earnings or wages with respect to the 
unemployment rate in the local labour market from four studies that report such estimates 
separately for unionised and nonunionised workers.  These studies draw on micro data sets 
from the United Kingdom, the United States and the Nordic countries. 
Strikingly, each of the studies listed in Table 1 finds greater wage curve elasticities for 
nonunionised workers than for unionised workers, although differences are not always 
statistically significant.  In particular, strong indications that nonunion wages are more 
sensitive to regional unemployment rates appear in the evidence from the United Kingdom.  
For example, Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) find that an increase in local unemployment has 
little effect on hourly wages of unionised workers but a severe negative effect on wages of 
nonunionised workers.  According to the estimates in the first row of Table 1, a doubling of the 
local unemployment rate will raise the hourly wage of unionised workers by (an insignificant) 
one percent and reduce the wage of non-unionised workers by 12 percent.  While Blanchflower 
and Oswald note such differences, they place no stress on the differential responses of union 
and nonunion wages to local unemployment.  Instead, they observe that the union-sector wage 
curve elasticity tends to be estimated imprecisely, particularly in data from the United States 
where samples of unionised workers often are limited in size (1994, p. 159). No U.S. results 
are reported for hourly wages with regional fixed effects. The huge differences between union 
and nonunion workers are found for annual earnings, and one might expect this to reflect 
annual hours being less sensitive to local labour market conditions in the union than in the 
nonunion sector. The difference by union status is minor in Turunen (1998), but this may 
reflect that the NLSY sample is for young workers for whom union affiliation is less important.    
 Albæk et al. (1999) report separate elasticities for union and nonunion sectors for each 
of the Nordic countries.  In Finland, Norway, and Sweden, the absolute values of the 
coefficients are higher in the nonunion sector than in the union sector, but none of the 
differences is statistically significant.  With respect to the Danish results, they comment that 
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the union variable is actually membership in an unemployment insurance scheme rather than 
union membership, which may bias the results for Denmark considerably.  The reported figures 
are from specifications without regional dummies. They find that the wage curve disappears 
altogether for these four countries once fixed regional effects are accounted for.  The reported 
figures thus represent a medium- or long-term relationship between wages and unemployment 
in the Nordic countries, rather than transitory wage curve effects.  
In sum, existing evidence suggests that wage responsiveness to local labour market 
conditions varies between union and nonunion workers, but the results for the United States 
and the Nordic countries are far from conclusive. First, we would like to provide more solid 
evidence, and, second, to draw inferences regarding the underlying theory of the wage curve 
from examining differences in union-nonunion wage curve elasticities across the United States, 
Great Britain and Norway. 
 
 3. Combining rent-sharing and efficiency wage explanations of the wage curve 
In this section, we develop a theoretical model in which local labour market conditions 
potentially affect wages through either efficiency wage or wage bargaining channels, or both. 
Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) present three distinct models that all generate a wage curve 
response in the local labour market: a region-specific implicit contract model, an efficiency 
wage model, and a bargaining model. Card (1995) is dismissive of the implicit contract model 
as an explanation of the wage curve, pointing out that key predictions of the model are 
inconsistent with Blanchflower and Oswalds own empirical evidence. 
The primary objective of our paper is to seek evidence on the relative strengths of the 
remaining two theoretical explanations of the wage curve. Accordingly, our theoretical 
framework nests a simple efficiency wage model with endogenous turnover and a standard 
bargaining, or rent-sharing, model as limiting cases. In this framework, the EW and WB 
mechanisms interact as local unemployment affects turnover costs and thus the magnitude of 
rents over which the union and the firm bargain. We use this framework primarily in order to 
study how the sensitivity of wages to the level of local unemployment - the wage curve - is 
influenced by the bargaining power of the union.  
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One might expect that combining efficiency wage and bargaining models of the wage 
curve would necessarily produce the prediction that the wage curve elasticity will be greater in 
the presence of unions. This is because where unions are absent there is only the efficiency 
wage effect but where unions are present there is both an efficiency wage and a bargaining 
effect of unemployment, both leading to lower wages at higher levels of unemployment. The 
novelty of our analysis, however, is that we find that combining the efficiency wage and 
bargaining models generates a third effect which we describe as the rent effect of local 
unemployment and which causes the wage curve to be less elastic in the presence of unions, 
thereby offsetting the separate efficiency wage and bargaining effects. The intuition for the rent 
effect is that higher unemployment leading to lower turnover costs generates greater rents in 
the firm which the union will share in the form of a moderated reduction in the wage level. 
This is the reason why the wage curve is likely to be less elastic in the presence of unions. We 
now develop a formal theoretical framework in which to explore these issues. 
 The efficiency wage mechanism is due to endogenous turnover costs, given by 
(1) 
η−






−
=
Wu
WHC
)1(
, η > 0 
where u is the local unemployment rate and W  is the average local wage rate. C can be 
interpreted as replacement costs per worker defined by the product of hiring costs per worker, 
H, and the probability that a worker quits (see Campbell and Orzag (1998)). In equation (1), 
the separation probability is assumed to depend on the current wage relative to the alternative 
wage, W , weighted by u−1 , which measures the probability of becoming re-employed. The 
parameter -η is the elasticity of quits with respect to expected relative pay.  
 The firms profit is given by: 
(2) WLCLLR −−=Π )(  
where R(L) is total revenue. For simplicity, the local union is assumed to care only about the 
bargained wage level.  
 We assume that during a potential conflict over an agreement (e.g., a strike), the firm 
receives a zero payoff, while the union receives Wu)1( −ϕ , where [0,1]ϕ ∈  measures the 
fraction of the expected alternative wage that workers may obtain as income during a strike. If 
ϕ = 0, workers recieve no income during a strike. In this case unemployment does not affect 
workers conflict pay and there is no bargaining microfoundation to the wage curve. As in 
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Blanchflower and Oswald, the wage curve associated with bargaining arises because higher 
unemployment lowers workers threat points. From (2), the Nash-maximand is given by: 
(3) ββϕ −Π−−= 1))1(( WuWN  
where β is the bargaining power of the union.  
The first order condition for the maximum of (log) N is: 
(4) (1 ) ( ' 1)
(1 )
wL C
R CL WLW u W
bb
j
- +=
- -- -
 
All firms are assumed to be identical and in equilibrium we have W W= . Inserting this 
equilibrium condition into (4) gives: 
(5) CbCybW η)1()( −+−=  
where 
(6) 1
)1()1(1
0 ≤
−−−
=≤
u
b
ϕβ
β  
and y=R/L is revenue per worker. Note that if ϕ = 0, then b = β.  
Consider first the limiting cases, which describe the efficiency wage and pure 
bargaining models, respectively, in equation (5).  
 
(i) The pure efficiency wage (EW) model of the wage curve 
The pure efficiency wage model occurs when β = 0. From (5), we see that the 
equilibrium wage level in the pure EW model is given by: 
(7) W* = ηC, 
where the superscript denotes the pure efficiency wage benchmark outcome. The efficiency 
wage is proportional to the turnover-cost per worker.  The benchmark efficiency wage elasticity 
of wages with respect to unemployment is then  
(8) 
*
*
* 01
W u u
u uW
l h∂= = - <
∂ -
 
as in Campbell and Orzag (1998). The EW unemployment elasticity, λ*, is proportional to the 
elasticity of turnover with respect to local unemployment and is decreasing in η.  
Notice that since W* = ηC, the bargained wage given by (5) can be interpreted as a 
weighted average of the rents per worker, net of turnover-costs, and the efficiency wage. We 
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know from the above that the weight, b, is equal to b  when the alternative wage is 
independent of local unemployment, i.e., when ϕ = 0.  
 
(ii) The pure wage bargaining (WB) model of the wage curve 
The pure bargaining model arises under the special case that η=0. In this case, it 
follows from (1) and (5) that the equilibrium bargained wage (WB) with exogenous turnover 
(and associated costs) is given by: 
(9) WB =  b(y-H).  
b is defined in (6) and is a function of u. From (9) and (6), local unemployment affects the 
bargained wage through its influence on the expected alternative wage and thereby on the 
conflict pay-off of the union. Thus, under pure bargaining, the benchmark elasticity of the 
derived wage curve is given by the elasticity of the alternative wage with respect to 
unemployment. From (9) and (6), this is given by: 
(10) (1 ) 0
1 (1 ) (1 )
B u
u
b jl
b j
-= - £
- - -
  
which is our formalization of the bargaining model mechanism discussed by Blanchflower and 
Oswald (1994). From (10), it follows that the absolute value of the elasticity of the pure 
bargained wage with respect to unemployment is decreasing in ϕ; that is, the smaller the 
proportion of expected alternative wages obtained during a strike, the smaller is the impact of 
unemployment on wages.  
 
(iii) Efficiency wage and wage bargaining models of the wage curve combined 
In the pure bargaining model of the wage curve, we assumed that turnover was exogenous to 
the level of unemployment. Consider now the case with endogenous turnover. In this case both 
bargaining and efficiency wage mechanisms influence wages. First, from (1), we define the 
elasticity of net revenue with respect to unemployment: 
(11)  0
1
.)( >
−−
=
−∂
−∂
=
Cy
C
u
u
Cy
u
u
CyR ηλ  
This represents the rent effect of local unemployment on bargained wages. This rent effect is 
positive since higher unemployment decreases turnover costs. Consequently, it is increasing in 
the absolute value of the turnover elasticity, η.  
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 Using the definitions of *λ , Bl , and Rλ  given in (8), (10) and (11) respectively, the 
combined wage curve elasticity derived from (5) and (6) can be written as:  
(12) * (1 )( )(1 ) B Rb y Cp p
W
hl l l l+ -= + - +  
where p=(W*/W)≤1 . Recall that W* denotes the pure efficiency wage and that W denotes the 
equilibrium bargained wage in the combined model. The formulation for the combined wage 
curve elasticity given in (12) enables us to view the total wage curve elasticity as combining 
three elements: the pure efficiency wage effect, the alternative wage effect and the rent effect.  
The rent effect is a novel feature of the combined model, as it does not appear in the 
limiting cases of the existing bargaining (η=0) or efficiency wage models (β=0). The intuition 
behind the rent effect is that as unemployment increases, turnover costs fall and the rent to be 
shared rises. Since the bargaining model is a rent-sharing mechanism, increased rent feeds into 
higher wages. The two first terms of λ are both negative, while the last term is positive. One 
implication of this is that if Bl  (i.e., the alternative wage effect) is sufficiently small relative to 
the rent effect, then the wage curve elasticity under union bargaining will be smaller (in 
absolute terms) than in the nonunion case.  
It follows from equation (12) that: 
(13) 00* =<= βλλ for , 
(14) 10 =>= βλλ forR . 
Thus, with no rent sharing ( 0β = ), we are back in the pure efficiency wage case. In the 
monopoly union case ( 1β = ), the wage curve elasticity equals the pure rent-effect of 
unemployment, which is positive. When the union is free to set whatever wage it prefers, it 
collects all the rents: that is, W = y - C. From (13) and (14), it is clear that comparing a 
nonunion case with a strong-union case, the elasticity of wages with respect to unemployment 
is not only higher under the latter, but it is actually positive. 
 The strong assumption of a monopoly union is convenient to derive simple theoretical 
predictions, but hardly plausible. The more interesting question concerns how the 
unemployment elasticity changes with the bargaining power of the union. We can show that as 
union bargaining power increases, (i) the alternative wage effect becomes weaker, and (ii) the 
rent effect becomes stronger, pulling λ upwards and flattening out the wage curve as the union 
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becomes more powerful. It is straightforward to see that the rent effect must be increasing in 
union bargaining power. To see how the alternative wage effect responds to a change in 
bargaining power consider equation (10). From (10), it follows that the alternative wage effect, 
λB, is increasing (that is, decreasing in absolute value) in the bargaining power of the union as:  
(15)  2 0(1 (1 ) (1 ))
B u
u
dl j
db b j
= ≥
- - -
 
The intuition behind this result is straightforward. As the bargaining power of the union 
increases, more weight is given to the inside factor, y-H in (5), and less weight to the outside 
expected alternative wage component.  
Consider equation (12) once more. From (12), the derivative of λ with respect to β is 
given by: 
(16)  
*( ) (1 ) ( 1)( )
B
B R
b
p Wp y Cl ll l h l
b b b b
∂∂ ∂ ∂= - - + - + + -
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
- + + +
 
For λ*<λB, λ is unambiguously increasing with the bargaining power of the union, causing the 
wage curve to flatten as the union becomes more powerful. The first term represents an 
increased weight on the alternative wage effect compared to the efficiency wage effect of 
unemployment, when β rises. The second term reflects the influence of increased bargaining 
power on the alternative wage effect. The third term is the increased impact of the rent-sharing 
effect as the rent sharing parameter increases.  
From (16), it follows that introducing bargaining in a pure efficiency wage situation, 
may initially lead to more sensitivity towards unemployment if the efficiency wage effect is 
small and the share of alternative income in workers conflict payoff is very large, such that 
λ*>λB. In this case λ may become more negative as β increases, since we have one negative 
influence counteracting the two positive effects. The condition for the efficiency wage effect to 
be smaller or equal to the alternative wage effect may be written as: 
(17)  1
(1 ) (1 )u
hb b
h j
£ = -
+ -
!  
For β smaller than "b , the first term of (16) is negative. We note a number of properties of the 
critical level. First, "b decreases with η; the larger the efficiency wage effect (in absolute 
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terms), the smaller is "b . Second, "b  decreases with the share of alternative wage accruing to 
workers during a conflict, ϕ. For  
(18) 
)1)(1( u−+
≤
η
ηϕ  
any positive β is greater than "b and λ is always increasing in β. If condition (18) is not met, 
there is a region, bounded from above by "b , in which λ may initially decrease with β.  
 The interpretation of this result is as follows. Initially, for small values of β, the 
alternative wage effect may be larger than the efficiency wage effect. Since the rent-sharing 
parameter is small for small values of β, the positive influence of the rent sharing effect of 
unemployment is limited. Increasing β means putting more weight on the alternative wage 
effect, which then tends to pull the wage curve elasticity (-λ) upwards. However, we found that 
the alternative wage effect approaches zero as β increases and the union gains more protection 
from external market pressures. The sign of λ*-λB changes from negative to positive at "b b= . 
From then on all three effects contribute to a wage which is less sensitive to local 
unemployment as a consequence of a more powerful union.  
Our model predicts that introducing bargaining in a pure efficiency wage situation, may 
initially lead to more sensitivity towards unemployment if the efficiency wage effect is small 
and the share of alternative income in workers conflict payoff is very large. However, two 
other forces work in the other direction. As bargaining power increases, the alternative wage 
effect diminishes and the rent-sharing effect goes up. We find the region of falling λ to have 
little empirical relevance. First, there are considerable wage curve effects in nonunion sectors, 
see for example, previous evidence reported above.  Second, it seems unlikely that workers 
obtain a very large share of alternative income during a strike. Third, there are counteracting 
forces from the last two terms of (16) which means that the potential minimum of λ is well 
below "b . Finally, a very low level of β is not of much empirical interest when comparing 
union with nonunion sectors. It is likely that, even in a nonunionised sector there may exist 
rent-sharing mechanisms and union recognition with bargaining introduces non-trivial levels of 
union influence on wages. Consequently, we view the result that bargaining might increase the 
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sensitivity of wages with respect to unemployment as unlikely to have significant empirical 
relevance. 
As we indicated at the beginning of this section, one might have expected that 
combining efficiency wage and wage bargaining models would have produced a wage curve 
elasticity which was a weighted sum of the elasticities in the two models. The main result from 
our theoretical analysis is, however, that the encompassing model also produces another effect 
of unemployment; namely the rent-sharing effect. This effect is always positive since higher 
unemployment produces lower turnover costs and thus more rents to be shared. And, most 
important, as bargaining power increases, the rent-sharing effect increasingly dominates the 
other two effects. Eventually, as the bargaining power parameter approaches unity, the positive 
rent-sharing effect is the only mechanism through which unemployment affects wages.  
Let us summarise the key predictions arising out of the theoretical framework. First, if 
wage curves are generated solely through collective wage bargaining, then we would not 
expect to find wage curves in the nonunion sector. Second, if efficiency wage mechanisms 
underpin the wage curve, then we would expect to find wage curves in the nonunion sector. 
Third, assuming that efficiency wages are just as likely to characterise union as nonunion 
workplaces, then we would not be surprised to find an efficiency-wage generated wage curve 
in the union sector. However, we would expect any efficiency-wage based wage curve to be 
smaller in absolute magnitude in the union than in the nonunion sector, partly as a result of the 
rent-effect which we have identified in the current paper. Fourth, we would expect wage curves 
to be less elastic in countries with stronger unions and with more pervasive union wage 
bargaining. These are the predictions to which we address our empirical analysis in the 
subsequent sections of the paper. 
  
3.1 Age, experience and turnover  
In this paper, we focus on differences in the wage curve by union status. As noted above, Card 
(1995) observed how in principle patterns of variation in the wage curve elasticity across 
groups could be used to choose between competing theories of the wage curve. The pure 
efficiency wage model we have presented predicts that the absolute magnitude of the wage 
curve elasticity will be increasing in η , the elasticity of the quit rate with respect to expected 
relative pay. The quit rate is higher for younger and less experienced workers and also more 
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sensitive to relative wages. Therefore, η  is inversely related to the age (experience) of the 
worker. Thus, the pure EW model predicts a more elastic wage curve for younger, less 
experienced workers. The impact of η  on the unemployment elasticity in the union sector is 
smaller.  
Consider this in the context of the combined model. Equation (13) can be re-written as: 
(19) [ ](1 ) (1 )
1
B up p b b
u
l l h= - + - -
-
. 
In this formulation, the wage curve elasticity, λ , is defined as a weighted average of Bl , the 
elasticity of the alternative wage with respect to unemployment, and of the term in square 
brackets, where the weights are given by 1-p and p, respectively. Recall that p=W*/W, and 
hence varies with β. Equation (19) lends itself to a straightforward diagrammatic 
representation: see Figure 1. 
In the nonunion case (b=0), * /(1 )Nonunion u ul l h= = - - , as given by equation (8). In 
the union case, Unionl is given by (19), or by the weighted average of Bl  and f in Figure 1. A 
number of properties emerge from consideration of equation (19) and its representation in the 
Figure.  First, as argued above for the case of the pure EW model, Nonunionl  falls as η  increases. 
Second, the effect on Unionl of a change in η  is ambiguous: Unionl  first rises and then falls in 
η . Third, at least for large η , the absolute magnitude of the difference between Nonunionl and 
Unionl  is increasing in η . We address these testable propositions within the unionised EW 
model in the empirical sections below.  
 
3.2 Robustness 
The predictions of wage setting models are frequently sensitive to the more or less explicit 
assumptions underlying the theoretical set-up. Do our results rely on our specific bargaining 
model and efficiency wage mechanism, or can we consider them to be more general? Consider 
the more general, although ad hoc, wage setting mechanism, where  
(20) [ ]ee wEyrwW −+= )(  
where we denotes the equilibrium efficiency wage, E is an efficiency indicator and r is a rent-
sharing parameter, 0 1r< < . Any efficiency wage model where productivity (value added) is 
enhanced by unemployment, for instance a Shapiro-Stiglitz (1984) type of model, produces the 
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efficiency wage effect of unemployment, comparable to λ* in our setup. The impact on wages 
is found by taking the derivative of W with respect to we in (20). More importantly, for any 
positive r, any such model involves the rent effect as well, the impact of which is to be found 
by taking the derivative of W with respect to E above. Again, we note that the combined 
impact from the efficiency wage mechanisms implies a positive relationship between the rent 
sharing parameter r and the elasticity of wages with respect to unemployment. The larger 
fraction of the rent accruing to workers, the larger is the impact of the positive rent-effect of 
unemployment on wages.  
 We use the above set up with turnover costs for two reasons. The first is that a simple 
expression for λ is already available in the literature (Campbell and Orzag, 1998) and that the 
model has a strong standing in the theoretical literature, see for example Weiss (1991). It is 
also closely related to the equilibrium wage distribution literature, Burdett and Mortensen 
(1998) and Green, Machin and Manning (1996), even though the quit-function here is a major 
simplification. The second is that we tend to believe that endogenous turnover is an important 
feature of most firms and establishments. Barth and Dale-Olsen (1999) find in an empirical 
study that establishment turnover, over and above that required to adjust the stock of 
employees, is sensitive to the wage policy of the establishment. In any case, we argue that our 
main result does not rely on this specific efficiency wage mechanism, but only on the 
assumption that productivity is affected by the level of local unemployment.  
Of course, the rent-sharing coefficient, r, may itself be affected by unemployment, as in 
our model above, in which the feedback effect through alternative wages affects the outcome. 
Other mechanisms are also plausible. For example, unemployment may affect the ability of one 
of the parties to put up a credible ultimatum threat, thus affecting the bargaining power 
parameter. The main point to make here, however, is that our main result survives even with an 
exogenous r and does not rely on the specific modelling of the alternative income effect.  
Our model assumes decentralized wage setting, with wage increments in one firm 
affecting other workers and firms through turnover and its associated costs. Under centralised 
bargaining, firms may incur given turnover costs for lower wages. Workers too may benefit 
from coordinated wage moderation either in terms of higher after-tax wages, if we take into 
account that unemployment benefits are financed by income taxes - see, for example, Holden 
and Raaum (1991) - or if coordination gives workers other incentives to internalise the 
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employment effects of higher wages.1 Once coordinated wage setting takes place, the empirical 
wage curve may look different, even if the same basic mechanisms work on turnover and 
alternative income.   
From our theoretical analysis, we conclude that the wage curve effect is likely to be 
smaller in an unionised environment than in a nonunion environment. Thus, within countries 
we expect to find a lower wage elasticity with respect to unemployment in the union sector 
than in the nonunion sector. Moreover, because of the higher levels of unionisation and of 
centralisation and coordination of bargaining in Norway, we would also expect to observe 
lower wage curve elasticities in Norway than in the United States and Great Britain. 
 
3.3 A two-sector model 
The model developed in the preceding section analyses the case of homogeneous firms where 
no mobility exists between union and nonunion jobs. In this section, we argue that our main 
result prevails also in a two-sector setting. With mobility between sectors, the workers outside 
option consists of either unemployment or of employment in one of the two sectors. Consider 
now the effect of increased unemployment. The process leading to our equilibrium wage 
(equation (5) above) may be thought of as occurring in two stages. First, firms or 
establishments respond to a higher unemployment rate, given wages elsewhere, with a 
reduction in their own wage level: there is a wage cut in each firm. In the second stage, there is 
a feedback effect from reduced average wages in all other firms, which in turn leads to an even 
lower wage in each firm, and so on. In a two-sector setting, the feedback effect is influenced by 
wage reactions in both sectors. The expected outside wage, jw , can be modelled as: 
(21) (1 ) (1 )j j u j nu W Ww a aÈ ˘= - + -Î ˚  
where the ja  (j=u,n) is the probability of getting a job in the union sector.  
In this case, there are feedback effects across the two sectors. First, there is a direct 
effect from the (1-u) term. Second, there is the indirect effect from the reaction of other firms 
to unemployment and so on. The feedback effect works through the average wages in equation 
(21). For the nonunion sector, the fact that the union sector wages enters the expression for the 
alternative wage introduces less sensitivity of wages to unemployment than if only nonunion 
                                                 
1 There is an extensive literature on why employers and unions may have incentives to coordinate wage setting, 
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sector wages were included in the calculation of the outside option. The reason is that the 
relatively unemployment-inelastic union wage enters the expression for the outside wage. And 
similarly, the feedback effect for the union sector is more wage-elastic since the nonunion 
wage response enters the calculation of outside wages. The feedback effect across sectors thus 
tends to moderate the original difference between the two sectors. This mechanism, however, is 
a second-order effect, working only if there is a difference in elasticities in the first place. 
Although feedback effects between sectors reduce differences, they cannot eliminate the 
difference in wage elasticities between sectors. Hence, our previous results hold also for a two-
sector model.   
 
4. U.S., British and Norwegian data 
In the light of the theoretical analysis presented above, we estimate wage curves for 
three different economies.  Because the theoretical model explicitly models the wage-setting 
process of profit maximising unionised and nonunionised firms, the empirical analyses are of 
private sector workers and the dependent variable is the log of the hourly wage of the worker. 
The U.S. estimates are based on two data sources: the Outgoing Rotation Group 
samples from the Current Population Survey (CPS) and the National Longitudinal Survey of 
Youth (NLSY).  The CPS is a monthly survey of about 50,000 households, and each month 
one-quarter of the respondents (the outgoing rotation groups) provide detailed employment 
information including current wages.  Although the survey has been conducted for more than 
50 years, the question about union membership has been asked on a monthly basis only since 
January 1983.  Accordingly, our CPS samples are drawn from the January 1983 through 
December 2000 surveys.  The NLSY is an ongoing longitudinal survey of a nationally 
representative sample of 12,686 youths aged 14-22 in 1979.  Our samples are drawn from the 
first 18 waves (1979 through 1998) of the survey.  
The classification of workers into union and nonunion sectors differs somewhat across 
the two U.S. data sources.  In the CPS samples, we classify union workers as those who hold 
membership in a trade union or an employee association similar to a union.  Unfortunately, 
the NLSY has not asked respondents about union membership on a consistent basis, so we rely 
                                                                                                                                                          
see, e.g., Hoel (1989), Moene and Wallerstein (1993) and Layard et al. (1991) for careful analyses. 
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instead on information about whether wages on the particular job were set by collective 
bargaining.  Besides the very different age distributions of respondents, differences in union 
classification may be expected to generate differences in estimates of unemployment 
elasticities in the two data sets. 
We limit the U.S. regression samples to non-agricultural, private-sector workers 16 to 
64 years of age, and exclude those who are self-employed or usually work one hour or less per 
week.  We also drop observations with hourly wages below $1 per hour (constant 1982-84 
dollars) or with missing data on variables used in the analysis.  The hourly wage is defined as 
the rate of pay for hourly employees and as weekly earnings divided by usual hours worked per 
week for salaried workers.  The sample restrictions leave total samples of 2,353,202 
observations (of whom 52.7 percent are male and 12.1 percent are members of a trade union) 
from the CPS and 89,210 observations (53.1 percent male and 16.0 percent union) from the 
NLSY.  We merge the micro samples with monthly data on unemployment in the state of 
residence, defining the unemployment rate most relevant to the prevailing labour contract as 
the average local unemployment rate over the 12 months prior to the wage observation. The 
unemployment rates are collected from the Local Area Unemployment Statistics (LAUS) 
program of the Bureau of Labor Statistics.   
The British data are taken from the first seven waves (1991-1997) of the British 
Household Panel Survey (BHPS), a nationally representative survey. The full survey contained 
information on just over 10,000 individuals. The sample used for the estimations reported in 
the current paper is based on employees aged between 16 and 64 employed in the private 
sector. Combining information across the waves, the total sample size is 21,109 workers. 
Workers are classified as employed in the union sector if a union is reported as present at their 
establishment. Where a union is reported as not present, the worker is classified as employed in 
the nonunion sector. Thus, the union/nonunion distinction is defined on the basis of the 
characteristics of the establishment, not of the individual worker. This is consistent with the 
theoretical model in which wage-setting is based not on individual bargaining but on union-
firm bargaining. We would expect the individuals wage to reflect the bargaining status of the 
union at the establishment, not the individuals personal union membership status. For a further 
discussion of this issue, see Barth, Raaum and Naylor (2000), and Andrews, Stewart, Swaffield 
and Upward (1999). Separate regressions are run for union and nonunion sectors and for male 
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and female workers. The dependent variable is the log of hourly pay. Unemployment refers to 
the percentage of the labour force in the relevant Travel-to-Work-Area (TTWA) who are 
unemployed at the time of the survey interview.  
The Norwegian data is register based. It is drawn from the register of employer and 
employees at Statistics Norway. The sample includes 111 463 observations of wage earners 
from 1991 to 1997. Representative samples are drawn independently each year. The analysis is 
conducted for full-time workers. The wage is based on daily wage for full-time workers, 
corrected for predicted hours (from the level of living survey 1995) for full-time workers based 
on gender, education, region, industry and age. The information on gender, schooling, (Mincer) 
experience, region, industry and seniority are register-based and highly reliable. The sample 
includes persons from 16 to 64 years of age. Extreme wage observations are removed. 
Information on union membership is taken from individual wage reports and thus includes only 
union members who pay their dues through the employer. This is common practice for the 
large majority of union members in Norway. The Norwegian unemployment figures are 
collected at county level.   
In sum, we find the data from the three countries comparable, but there are also several 
differences. The outcome variable is the hourly wage, the set of controls includes broadly 
comparable variables, age bands cover the same groups and the time periods are similar. The 
union worker definition differs somewhat, as the CPS and the Norwegian data use individual 
membership, while the split is based on union existence at the establishment in the NLSY 
source and the BHPS. The aggregation level differs as we study states in the United States, 
counties in Norway and TTWAs in Great Britain. The focus, however, is on differences by 
union status within countries. All in all, the comparability is sufficiently high to make 
interesting cross-country observations.   
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5. Empirical wage curves  
Wage curve estimates by gender and by union status are reported in Table 2. The 
unemployment elasticities are based on the static model of Blanchflower and Oswald2;  
(22) logirt rt irt r t irtw u X d fa l g n= + + + + + , 
where wirt is the (log) wage rate of individual i in region r observed in period t,  Xirt is a set of 
individual controls (such as age, education, and industry affiliation), dr and ft are unrestricted 
fixed regional effects and period effects, respectively, and νirt denotes the error term.  
Basically, the unemployment elasticity, fixed regional effects, period effects and coefficients of 
control variables are estimated using a series of stacked cross-sections.3 Applying region-by-
period clustering, any period-specific correlations in error terms within regions are taken into 
account when estimating the standard error of the unemployment elasticity, see Moulton 
(1990), Card (1995).  
 In all countries, the estimates of the male unemployment elasticity are negative and 
statistically significant in the samples of nonunion workers. The wages of male union workers 
are, however, less affected by the local unemployment rate. In the CPS data for the United 
States and in Norway, the point estimates are close to zero for union males, while the negative 
NLSY estimate is not statistically different from zero.4 The British estimate for union males is 
negative, but not statistically different from zero. As the precision of the estimated 
unemployment elasticities in Great Britain and Norway are low, we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that union and nonunion estimates are equal. The point estimates, however, are 
indeed lower (in absolute value) in the union sector. In the CPS data, the difference in 
unemployment elasticities between male union and nonunion workers is clearly statistically 
significant.  
For females, the nonunion elasticities are all negative, but much lower in absolute value 
compared to males (in the same country). In Great Britain, wages of females in the nonunion 
sector are not affected by local labour market conditions. Moreover, only the U.S. estimates are 
significantly different from zero. Among female union workers, wages are basically unrelated 
                                                 
2 A dynamic version based on the panels of regions is discussed in the next section.  
3 In other words, the panel elementthat the same individuals are observed in more than one yearof the NLSY, 
British and Norwegian samples is ignored.   
4 The difference between estimates from the CPS and NLSY samples may result from differences in age 
composition of the two samplesa topic we return to below.   
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to regional unemployment except for the CPS data where the unemployment elasticity is highly 
positive.  
The various estimates in Table 2 form independent observations of union/nonunion 
differences in wage responsiveness to regional unemployment. We therefore consider a test 
based on differences between the average coefficients from the nonunion and union sectors 
across all samples. The average male nonunion elasticity across the four samples is 0.0738 
with a standard error of 0.0121. The average male union elasticity is 0.0292 with a standard 
error of 0.0162. The difference between the average coefficients for the nonunion and union 
sectors, 0.0446, is significantly different from zero with a t-value of 2.21. Similarly, for the 
female sample, the difference has a t-value of 2.13. Considering the averages from both male 
and female samples, the difference of 0.0441 has a t-value of 2.91. The meta analysis thus 
rejects the hypothesis of equal wage responsiveness between nonunion and union sectors.  
In sum, the empirical evidence supports the key prediction of the efficiency wage 
model: nonunion wages are adversely affected by worsened conditions in the local labour 
market and more so than union wages. In fact, there is no statistically significant downward 
sloping wage curve for union workers in any of the three countries.  
The U.S. estimates reported in Table 2, based on the CPS samples, are substantially 
smaller than those of Blanchflower and Oswald (1994; 1995).  According to Table 2, a 
doubling of the local unemployment rate will reduce wages of nonunionised males by 4 
percent and females by 1.6 percent.  Some of the discrepancy with prior studies may be 
because ours are estimates of the responsiveness of hourly wages while Blanchflower and 
Oswald typically study annual earnings.  Card (1995) and Bratsberg and Turunen (1996) find 
smaller wage curve elasticities when the dependent variable is the hourly wage.  For male 
nonunion workers, the estimate in Table 2 is in line with those of the Card and 
Bratsberg/Turunen studies.  
In the U.S. data, the female union sector wage curve is found to be upward sloping. Our 
theoretical model offers two explanations. First, workers in female dominated unionised firms 
have higher bargaining power. There is no evidence to back up such an assumption, quite on 
the contrary, there is evidence that wages are lower in firms with more females  see, for 
example, Hellerstein et al (1997). Second, and perhaps more plausible, when quits respond 
weakly to changes in the expected relative wage, the rent-sharing effect (shown to be positive 
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in equation 16) dominates the efficiency wage effect at low levels of bargaining power. Barth 
and Dale-Olsen (1999a,b) provide evidence that the elasticity of quits is lower for women than 
for men, and Sicherman (1996) finds that, at low levels of tenure, women are less likely than 
men to leave the firm. 
A related empirical literature addressing union and nonunion wage structures in the 
United States has noted that union wages show less cyclical variation than nonunion wages 
(Lewis, 1963; 1986; Moore and Raisian, 1980; Hendricks, 1981).  The lack of cyclicality in 
union wages is often attributed to the generally longer duration of union contracts. When we 
alternatively use the lagged 3-year average state unemployment rate in the wage regression, we 
find that wage curve elasticities become slightly more negative in both sectors (results not 
shown).  Equally important, differences between unemployment effects in union and nonunion 
sectors are even larger than those in Table 2. We therefore conclude that the empirical pattern 
that wage curve responses are larger in the nonunion sector than in the union sector is not 
driven by differences in contract length in the two sectors.  
Compared to previous British studies, we find that the estimated male unemployment 
elasticities are in line with those reported in Blanchflower and Oswald (1994), around -0.1 
when the sample consists of both nonunion and union workers. Our nonunion estimate for 
males is about -.11 compared to Oswald and Blanchflowers estimate of 0.17 for nonunion 
plants in the Great Britain, obtained from the British Social Attitudes Survey. Again, part of 
this difference may stem from the fact that we use hourly rather than annual or weekly earnings 
information. Additionally, it may be that the wage curve elasticity has diminished in the Great 
Britain since the time at which the Blanchflower and Oswald estimates - based on data for the 
mid to late 1980s - were obtained.  
The Norwegian regressions reveal a significant wage curve for all males, but splitting 
by union membership shows that local labour market conditions affect only male nonunion 
wages. We find no significant wage curve for the remaining Norwegian samples. Such findings 
are consistent with Albæk et al. (2000), who conclude that, when fixed regional effects are 
controlled for, there are no wage curve effects in the Nordic countries. Albæk et al. interpret 
their finding as resulting from the rather high degree of centralization of bargaining in these 
countries, and argue that real wage flexibility is obtained at the national level rather than at the 
regional level. Because the standard wage curve regressions include time dummies, aggregate 
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wage flexibility is effectively swept out of the analysis. Moreover, in Norway the yearly central 
wage increments in the union sector effectively form a floor of wage growth in the nonunion 
sector as well, which may reduce regional wage responsiveness even in the nonunion sector.  
The results for Norway in Albæk et al. were based on data from 1989 to 1993, a period 
characterized by a high degree of centralization and rather small nominal wage increments. In 
contrast, the data underlying the present paper also include observations from 1993-97, a 
period during which local wage settlements formed a considerably larger part of total wage 
growth. Our conjecture is that this is the main reason why we now observe a significant wage 
curve for males in the nonunion sector in Norway. Our results for Norway conform reasonably 
well with the results reported by Dyrstad and Johansen (1999), who report a long run elasticity 
of wages with respect to regional unemployment of 0.02 for a pooled sample of union and 
nonunion workers in the manufacturing sector.  
Regional fixed effects are included in all our regressions, following the arguments by 
Blanchflower and Oswald that wage curve estimates otherwise will be biased by a correlation 
between permanent regional wage determinants and the unemployment rate. When we omit the 
regional dummies from the regressions, we find that estimates indeed are sensitive to the 
inclusion of fixed regional effects.5 
When we compare the group-specific unemployment elasticities across countries, it 
appears that the nonunion male elasticity is higher (in absolute value) in Great Britain and 
Norway than it is in the United States. This is surprising in light of the much larger union 
sectors in Great Britain and Norway, which we would expect to have spillover effects on 
nonunion wages. When union wages do not respond to local labour market conditions, the total 
effect on nonunion wages might be expected to be lower when spillover is dominant. A 
possible explanation for the unexpected result is that the static model is mis-specified and that 
it ignores potential dynamics in the process of wage formation. If the relationship between past 
                                                 
5 Consistent with the findings for the United States of Blanchflower and Oswald (1994), the coefficient of log 
unemployment tends to be positive when regional dummies are excluded from the regression model.  Moreover, at 
least for the nonunion samples, inclusion of regional fixed effects in the regression model is necessary to uncover 
a negative wage curve relationship.  For three out of four U.S. subsamples, the coefficient of unemployment turns 
significantly more negative (falls to zero in the case unionised males) when the regression includes regional 
effectsindicating positive long-term relationships between regional unemployment and wages for these samples. 
Similarly, in the samples from Great Britain estimated wage curve elasticities are more negative when the 
regression accounts for regional effects, although differences between estimates obtained with and without 
regional effects are not statistically significant. When regional dummies are removed from the equation, we find a 
more elastic wage curve for nonunion than union workers of both genders in Norway as well.  
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and current wages differs by union status and/or across countries, the conclusions drawn from 
the static model estimates in Table 2 will be misleading.  We therefore proceed by exploring 
wage dynamics in greater detail.  
 
6. Wage dynamics – A Wage or a Phillips Curve?  
The static wage curve model in section 5 is based on the premise that the entire impact of 
changes in unemployment on the level of wages takes place within one period (that is, one 
year). Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) claim that data for many countries, including the 
United States and Great Britain, support this hypothesis as the estimated coefficient on the 
lagged wage typically is close to zero. There is little consensus on this issue, however. For 
example, Card (1995) suggests that,  . . . the reports of the death of the Phillips curve are 
premature. More evidence on the dynamic relation between wages and unemployment will 
probably be required before economists disavow Phillips hypothesis, (p. 795). Indeed, 
Blanchard and Katz (1997) and Staiger et al. (2001) conclude that wage dynamics are present 
in the United States, and consequently, that the static model of Blanchflower and Oswald is 
mis-specified. Similarly, Bell, Nickell and Quintini (2000) find that dynamics are important in 
the United Kingdom, that is, that regional labour market conditions affect wages over a number 
of years. 
 Our study of wage dynamics is based on average wages at the regional level. We first 
estimate a series of annual, cross-sectional versions of equation (22).  These regressions 
include the regional dummies of the equation but omit time dummies and regional 
unemployment. The estimated coefficients of the regional dummies (region X year) thus 
constitute a panel data set of average regional wages adjusted for differences in observable 
wage determinants over time and across regions.  
A simple test for a Phillips curve versus a wage curve specification is suggested by 
Blanchflower and Oswald (1995) and also used by Blanchard and Katz (1997).6 Consider the 
following extension of the aggregated model 
(23) 1 logrt rt rt r t rtw w u d fa r l n-= + + + + +  
                                                 
6 Card (1995) suggests an alternative test discussed below.  
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where wrt is the adjusted regional log wage as described above. The autoregressive coefficient, 
ρ, captures the dynamics of the model. Note that if ρ=1, equation (23) is a standard Phillips 
curve, while if ρ=0, the equation is a static wage curve. Also note that the intermediate case 
(0<ρ<1) represents a dynamic wage curve, in which the impact of changes in (regional) 
unemployment lasts for more than one period. Consequently, the long-run unemployment 
elasticity is given by λ/(1-ρ). An implication is that comparisons of the (static) unemployment 
elasticities, such as those in Table 2, are misleading if wage dynamics (i.e., the ρs) differ 
across groups. 
There is a long-standing issue in the empirical literature on wage dynamics. As stressed 
by Blanchard and Katz (1999, p.71), there are important differences in the observed wage 
dynamics in the United States and Europe: The coefficient on the error correction term for the 
United States is close to zero with point estimates that are typically wrong signed . . . Put 
another way, the Phillips curve specification . . . appears to provide a good description of the 
data. In most European countries, however, the error correction term comes in with a 
significant, and right signed coefficient.  
Blanchard and Katz interpret the U.S./European dissimilarities in wage dynamics as 
resulting from underlying differences in the direct effect of productivity on wages, although 
they do not provide an elaborate analysis based on a micro model. The theoretical model of the 
present paper may, however, generate results in line with the observations of Blanchard and 
Katz. Consider the following simple modification to the turnover cost function in equation (1), 
with turnover costs proportional to lagged wages: 
(24) 1(1 ) (1 )
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where 0<h<1. Two types of mechanisms may be behind such a relationship. First, turnover 
costs may be linked to last periods wages, e.g., through contractual arrangements, or secondly, 
the fraction of workers actively searching for a new job may depend on the level of lagged 
outside wages. We have from (5): 
(25) ( ) (1 )W b y C b Ch= - + -  
It follows that the elasticity of the current wage with respect to the lagged wage is given by: 
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The elasticity of wages with respect to lagged wages, ρ, is positive and is decreasing in β. The 
minimum of ρ occurs in the monopoly union case; β=1 and ρ=C/y-C. The maximum is 
reached in the nonunion case where ρ=1. In other words, the nonunion case generates a Phillips 
curve relationship, while the union case is characterised by a dynamic wage curve (if any at 
all).  
 Thus, we obtain the following empirical predictions. First, in the log wage regression of 
equation (23), the coefficient of lagged log wages should be smaller in the union sector than in 
the nonunion sector. Second, the coefficient of log unemployment should be less negative for 
union workers than for nonunion workers. Given the stronger presence of unions in Europe 
compared to the United States, these predictions are consistent with the observations by 
Blanchard and Katz described above. We proceed with a more direct test of the model, 
comparing the results from simple dynamic models that distinguish between union and 
nonunion sectors.  
In Table 3, we report estimates of equation (23) using regional/state means. As 
expected, the static regional models (in which ρ is restricted to equal 0) produce 
unemployment elasticities very similar to those we find in the micro level regressions of Table 
2. The dynamic specification produces different results for the three countries. Starting with the 
United States, we first note that, when we pool union and nonunion workers, both the 
estimated wage dynamics (i.e., the coefficient of the lagged wage) and the effect of local 
unemployment are lower in our data than in Blanchard and Katz (1997, Table 2, column 4). 
Further checks (not reported) reveal that this is due primarily to the sample period; when we 
restrict samples to 1991 and earlier (as in Blanchard and Katz), coefficient estimates become 
more in line with those of the prior study.7 The coefficient of the lagged wage is significantly 
less than unity, but far away from zero, for both men and women. For the United States, both 
the Phillips curve and the static wage curve are rejected in the pooled samples. The log-run 
unemployment elasticity is much higher than reported by the static model, 0.122 versus 
0.028 for males and 0.112 versus 0.010 for females.  
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When we estimate the dynamic wage model separately by union status and gender, 
results support two central predictions of the theoretical model.  First, looking at the U.S. long-
run elasticities, we see that the linkage between wages and local unemployment is significantly 
more negative in the nonunion sector than in the union sector. There is no wage curve for union 
males and wages of female union workers are positively related to the state unemployment 
rate. In other words, the key finding of the previous section that wages in the nonunion sector 
are more sensitive to local labour market conditions than are wages in union sector is 
unaffected by the addition of wage dynamics to the empirical model. Second, the results reveal 
that the elasticity of wages with respect to lagged wages, ρ, is larger in the nonunion sector 
than in the union sector.8 This result is consistent with the prediction in equation (26) that the 
elasticity declines with higher bargaining power of workers. Thus, accounting for wage 
dynamics amplify the union-nonunion differences in unemployment elasticities uncovered by 
the static model.  
In Great Britain, wage dynamics appear to differ from those in the United States as the 
coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is close to zero for all groups. This gives rise to a 
static wage curve, consistent with the findings of Blanchflower and Oswald, but seems at odds 
with results reported by Bell et al. (2000) based on data from the British New Earnings Survey. 
Bell et al. study regional wages over the period 1976-1997 and find an average long-run 
elasticity of regional wages with respect to unemployment in the range 0.09 to 0.13 and the 
lagged dependent variable coefficient is between 0.50 and 0.75.9 Unfortunately, our seven-year 
panel is likely too short to avoid downward bias in estimates of wage dynamics (see Nickell, 
1981). Furthermore, wage formation may have changed in Britain, in that the dynamics are 
                                                                                                                                                          
7 The implication is that both the autoregression in hourly wages and the link to local unemployment have 
weakened over time.  Contributing less importantly to discrepancies with the prior study are differences in 
samples, model specifications, and aggregation of industry controls.   
8 Part of the union/nonunion differences may be the result of greater bias from measurement error in the lagged 
dependent variable in union samples.  When we alternatively use the lagged pooled wage (from columns 1 and 4) 
in the regressionsso that the extent of measurement error is similar across union and nonunion regressions
results again show that the coefficient of the lagged wage is significantly lower for union workers. 
9 A major conclusion of Bell et al. is that failure to control for unobserved region-specific trends generates an 
upward bias in the coefficient estimate of the lagged wage. When we follow Bell et al. and include regional trends 
in the regression, we too find that the lagged dependent variable coefficient becomes smaller. Because we fail to 
uncover wage dynamics in the UK data in the first place, however, accounting for regional trends does not affect 
our conclusions for Great Britain.  In the U.S. data, coefficient estimates of the lagged wage fall by approximately 
16 percent in the nonunion sector and 40 percent in the union sector when we include state-specific trends, but, 
again, none of the conclusions of this section are impacted by this experiment. To the contrary, differences 
between the union and nonunion sectors are reinforced. 
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different in the 1990s compared to the previous two decades. Separate estimations for the three 
seven-year periods of the regional panel used by Bell et al. (2000) yield coefficient estimates of 
the lagged dependent variable in the wage equation of -0.26, -0.22 and 0.34,10 suggesting that 
sluggishness has increased rather than decreased in Britain. From this we conclude that our 
panel from the United Kingdom is too short to obtain reliable estimates of the wage dynamics. 
Because similar results are obtained from analyses of different data, the lack of dynamics in 
our samples is not a peculiar feature of our data, nor does it indicate significant change in wage 
dynamics in the 1990s.    
For our purposes, the main point is that the dynamic model suggests an even larger 
difference between the nonunion and union sector than the difference observed in the static 
model. For females, there exists, as for female union workers in the United States, a positively 
sloped wage curve but the precision of the estimates is too low to make any strong conclusions.  
As for Great Britain, the Norwegian estimates of wage dynamics are based on a 
relatively short time period and are therefore less precise. The dynamics differ from those of 
the other two countries, however, as the estimate of ρ is negative in each of the Norwegian 
samples. The negative coefficient of the lagged wage may reflect the impact of centralised 
wage setting in which wages within regions tend to adjust to an economy-wide average. In 
particular, regions that experience low wages in one period (perhaps because of rising local 
unemployment) may experience a catch up in wages in the next period due to adjustment 
regulations in central wage settlements.   
A cross-country comparison based on the long-run elasticities in Table 3 shows that 
point estimates of the male unemployment elasticity are highest in the United States, followed 
by Great Britain. Norway has a considerably lower regional long-run unemployment elasticity. 
Comparing estimates by union status, however, reduce differences across countries. To some 
extent, the overall differences across countries in male wage flexibility are explained by 
differences in unionisation. There appears to be a static wage curve in Great Britain and a 
dynamic wage curve in the United States. Our results provide support for a Phillips-curve-like 
dynamic wage curve in the United States, as suggested by Blanchard and Katz, but not in 
Great Britain and Norway.  
                                                 
10 We are very grateful to Stephen Nickell who provided us with these estimates.  
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Card (1995) outlines an alternative strategy to test between the Phillips curve and the 
wage curve, based on a first-differenced version of the adjusted aggregated model:  
(27) 1 0 1 1log logrt rt rt rt rt t rtw w w u u fl l n- - -D = - = + + D + D  
The Phillips curve implies that λ-1=0, while the static wage curve implies that λ-1+ λ0=0 (i.e., 
no change in the regional wage component if unemployment remains constant in two 
consecutive periods). While the presence of both a lagged dependent variable and a regional 
fixed effect, together with possible serial correlation in the regional error term in equation (23), 
create problems - see Card (1995, p. 795) - the dynamic wage curve specification is not nested 
by the Card-specification. Consequently, his proposed strategy is to test the static version of 
the wage curve.   
Starting again with the CPS data, Table 4 reveals that for the pooled sample of U.S. 
males, both hypotheses are rejected. Consistent with Table 3, this suggests that a dynamic 
wage curve is the best representation of the U.S. data.  Splitting by union status reveals that the 
Phillips curve is rejected for nonunion males, but not for union members. However, the point 
estimate of the current unemployment remains insignificantly different from zero for male 
union workers. For U.S. females, we fail to reject the Phillips curve for nonunion workers, 
while the static wage curve is overwhelmingly rejected. In the female union case, however, the 
picture is mixed, with little support for either hypothesis.  
For Great Britain and Norway, the data are not sufficiently rich  that is, the panel is 
too short - to provide reliable insight into wage dynamics. Norwegian males represent the only 
case for which standard errors are sufficiently low to make meaningful inference and here we 
reject the Phillips curve at the ten percent level (p=0.056, last row Table 4). However, point 
estimates support the static wage curve specification for all groups in both Great Britain and 
Norway as the sum of unemployment coefficients are close to zero. The lagged unemployment 
coefficients are far from zero, indicating that Phillips curve specifications do not represent the 
data very well.  
  
7. Unemployment elasticities by age group  
The motivation for studying wage curves separately for young and old workers is threefold. 
First, we wish to investigate whether the differences we have uncovered by union status can be 
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attributed to composition effects, that the union samples consist mainly of older workers for 
whom wages are less affected by local labour market conditions. Table 5 shows that this is not 
the case. Even within age groups, union wages are typically less responsive to local 
unemployment rates than are nonunion wages. (The exceptions are for young males in Norway 
where both estimates are around .10, for young females in Britain where the standard errors 
are huge and for older British males.) Across groups and countries, the average wage curve 
elasticity is a statistically significant .053 for the nonunion sector and an insignificant .008 
for the union sector. The difference between the average elasticities is significant at the one 
percent level, with a t-statistic of 2.3. 
 Second, the efficiency wage framework implies that in the nonunion sector, the wages 
of younger workers should be more sensitive to local unemployment than wages of older 
workers. This follows from the assumption that young persons turnover behaviour is more 
sensitive to relative wages than is turnover of older workers. Older workers positions are more 
settled, either because of good matches or through a larger stock of firm-specific capital, and 
they are thus less likely to change jobs following adjustments in relative wages. This prediction 
is clearly supported by the data. Among nonunion workers, the coefficient for younger workers 
is consistently higher (in absolute terms), with British females again being the exception.  
 Third, our theory predicts that the differences between unemployment elasticities in the 
nonunion and union sectors are larger among younger workers. For American and British 
males, as well as for Norwegian women this is certainly true, but not so for the rest of the 
groups. However, for American females, only the wages of young nonunion workers are 
negatively impacted by local unemployment.  
The empirical patterns are similar in the dynamic specifications, see Table 6 and 7, 
although the problems associated with huge standard errors in Great Britain and Norway are 
accentuated when samples are split by age group.   
 
8. Conclusions  
We have explored how bargaining power of workers affects the slope of the wage curve in an 
efficiency wage model based on endogenous turnover costs. The theoretical framework we 
develop predicts a negatively sloped wage curve when wages are set unilaterally by the firm. 
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When workers can impose a loss on the firm during bargaining through union action, wages 
are likely to be less responsive to changes in local labour market conditions. The intuition for 
this result is quite simple. When local unemployment increases, there are conflicting effects on 
wages. On the one hand, the efficiency wage paid by the firm decreases as wage turnover is 
lower with higher unemployment. This effect is augmented when there is bargaining as the fall 
in the alternative wage leads to a lower bargained wage. On the other hand, however, the 
reduced quit rate raises the revenue of the firm, net of turnover costs, and this has a positive 
impact on the bargained wage. The relative magnitude of these effects will depend upon the 
relative bargaining power of the union and the firm: but it follows from the theoretical analysis 
that the wage will tend to be less downward sensitive to unemployment the greater is the 
unions bargaining power. 
A number of predictions from the theoretical model are tested by means of micro data 
from the United States, Great Britain and Norway. Amongst key results, we find first that male 
union wages are less responsive than nonunion wages to local labour conditions in all three 
countries. In fact, we find no statistically significant wage curves for union workers. These 
results suggest that efficiency wage mechanisms, rather than collective bargaining, are driving 
the negative relationship between wages and local labour market conditions. Second, we find 
that the differences between the sectors are even larger when allowing for potential wage 
dynamics. Third, we show that the different wage curves for union and nonunion workers 
cannot be explained by age composition as the difference exists even within age groups. 
Fourth, within the nonunion sector, younger workers have steeper wage curves. This 
observation represents further evidence in support of the efficiency wage explanation of wage 
flexibility. Fifth, there is evidence - consistent with the theoretical predictions - that Norwegian 
regional wages respond less to differences in local unemployment rates than is the case in the 
United States and Great Britain. Finally, our results suggest that there is a static wage curve for 
both Britain and Norway, while the U.S. results suggest a wage curve with dynamics. For the 
United States, both the pure static wage curve model and the pure Phillips curve specifications 
are rejected by the data.  
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Table 1: Union and Nonunion Wage Curve Evidence 
 
 
 
Study 
 
 
Nonunion 
 
 
Union 
 
Regional 
Effects? 
 
 
Comments 
     
Blanchflower and 
Oswald (1994) 
-.124 
(.033) 
.011 
(.039) 
Yes Great Britain 1985-89 
Hourly Wage 
 -.086 
(.005) 
-.071 
(.009) 
No United States 1987 
Weekly Earnings 
Blanchflower and 
Oswald (1995) 
-.182 
(.056) 
-.093 
(.053) 
Yes Great Britain 1983-91 
Weekly Earnings 
Private Sector 
 -.125 
(.028) 
-.076 
(.061) 
Yes United States 1982-87 
Annual Earnings 
Private Sector 
Turunen (1998) -.109 
(.005) 
 
-.061 
(.010) 
-.029 
(.012) 
 
-.060 
(.021) 
No 
 
 
Yes 
United States 1979-91 
Hourly Wage 
NLSY 
Albæk et al. (1999) -.043 
(.018) 
 
 
-.114 
(.021) 
 
 
-.076 
(.021) 
 
 
-.071 
(.031) 
-.084 
(.005) 
 
 
-.100 
(.010) 
 
 
-.049 
(.020) 
 
 
-.051 
(.013) 
No 
 
 
 
No 
 
 
 
No 
 
 
 
No 
Denmark 1980-90 
Hourly Wage 
Private Sector 
 
Finland 1989, 91, 93 
Hourly Wage 
Private Sector 
 
Norway 1989, 91, 93 
Hourly Wage 
Private Sector 
 
Sweden 1980, 91 
Hourly Wage 
Private Sector 
 
Notes:  Table lists the elasticity of earnings or wage with respect to regional unemployment rate.  
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  Great Britain data source is BSAS and U.S. data source is 
CPS, unless indicated otherwise. 
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Table 2: Wage Curve Elasticities by Gender and Union Status  
 
  
United States 
 
 
Great Britain 
 
Norway 
Data source: CPS NLSY BHPS Register data 
Period: 1983-2000 1979-98 1991-97 1991-97 
Unemployment 
measure: 
Monthly state 
unemployment rate 
averaged over 12 months 
prior to observation 
Like CPS Travel to work area  County-level 
unemployment rate 
Region: State (51) State (51) Travel to work area (333) County (20) 
Males      
All -.0277 -.0714 -.1010 -.0466 
 (.0031) (.0139) (.0294) (.0177)  
     
Nonunion -.0403 -.0832 -.1056 -.0660 
 (.0033) (.0153) (.0390) (.0242) 
     
Union .0104 -.0354 -.0747 -.0169 
 (.0054) (.0272) (.0523) (.0262) 
Females      
All -.0090 -.0259 -.0177 -.0159 
 (.0030) (.0132) (.0316) (.0229) 
     
Nonunion -.0157 -.0328 -.0033 -.0453 
 (.0031) (.0141) (.0401) (.0343) 
     
Union .0755  .0219 -.0102 .0097 
 (.0085) (.0324) (.0563) (.0268) 
Union fraction     
Males .164 .194 .387 .493 
Females .073 .122 .295 .498 
Observations     
Nonunion males 1 036 713 38 141 7 248 39 300 
Union males 203 489 9 189 4 581 38 237 
Nonunion fem 1 031 429 36 775 6 541 17 138 
Union females 81 571 5 105 2 739 16 988 
Controls  Schooling, experience 
and its square, and 
indicator variables for 
marital status, two 
races, SMSA, part-time 
status, 38 industries, 11 
months, 16 years, and 
50 states 
Schooling, experience 
and its square, seniority 
and its square, and 
indicator variables for 
two races, SMSA, part-
time status, 38 
industries, 11 months, 
16 years, and 50 states 
Age and its square and 
indicator variables for 
11 educational 
qualifications, marital 
status, part-time work, 
8 plant sizes, 9 
industries, 6 years, and 
216 TTWAs 
Schooling, experience 
and its square, 
seniority, 27 industries, 
6 years, and 19 counties  
 
Notes:  Data sources are the 1983-2000 Outgoing Rotation Groups of Current Population Survey (col. 1); 1979-98 
waves of National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (col. 2); 1991-97 waves of British Household Panel Survey (col. 
3); and 1991-97 register-based employer-employee data, Statistics Norway (col. 4).  Samples are restricted to 
private-sector wage and salaried workers.  Robust standard errors, clustered within region-year, are reported in 
parentheses.  Dependent variable is log hourly wage. Complete results are contained in Tables A1-A4. 
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Table 3: Dynamic Wage-Unemployment Relationships 
 
       
 Males Females 
 All Nonunion Union All Nonunion Union 
       
USA (CPS)       
Static model       
Log unemployment (λ) -.0346 -.0442 .0121 -.0116 -.0183 .0727 
 (.0059) (.0060) (.0072) (.0058) (.0058) (.0098) 
Dynamic model       
Lagged wage (ρ) .7207 .6836 .4396 .7537 .7443 .2262 
 (.0207) (.0222) (.0309) (.0206) (.0210) (.0350) 
Log unemployment (λ) -.0340 -.0381 .0005 -.0276 -.0289 .0507 
 (.0036) (.0040) (.0064) (.0034) (.0036) (.0103) 
       
Long-run elast. (λ/(1- ρ)) -.1217 -.1204 .0009 -.1121 -.1130 .0655 
       
Great Britain        
Static model       
Log unemployment (λ) -.0963 -.0944 -.0871 .0403 .0409 .0397 
 (.0311) (.0407) (.0513) (.0342) (.0435) (.0663) 
Dynamic model       
Lagged wage (ρ) -.0038 .0249 .1022 -.0405 .0029 .0524 
 (.0392) (.0406) (.0414) (.0384) (.0381) (.0497) 
Log unemployment (λ) -.0989 -.1052 -.0606 .0293 .0389 -.0664 
 (.0337) (.0444) (.0535) (.0357) (.0453) (.0743) 
       
Long-run elast. (λ/(1- ρ)) -.0985 -.1079 -.0674 .0282 .0390 -.0700 
       
Norway       
Static model       
Log unemployment (λ) -.0331 -.0550 .0083 -.0336 -.0653 .0010 
 (.0189) (.0284) (.0291) (.0288) (.0397) (.0363) 
Dynamic model       
Lagged wage (ρ) -.2792 -.0086 -.1416 -.3579 -.2646 -.2980 
 (.0632) (.0954) (.0986) (.0701) (.0953) (.1074) 
Log unemployment (λ) -.0408 -.0551 .0030 -.0263 -.0582 .0093 
 (.0183) (.0286) (.0292) (.0271) (.0384) (.0352) 
       
Long-run elast. (λ/(1- ρ)) -.0319 -.0546 .0026 -.0194 -.0460 .0072 
       
 
Notes:  Estimates are based on the two-step methodology of Blanchard and Katz (1997).  The dependent variable 
is the average regional residual from year- and group-specific log wage regressions using micro data (and 
sampling weights where applicable); control variables of these first-step regressions are those listed in Table 2, 
except for year and region indicator variables.  Second-step regressions include year and region fixed effects and 
are weighted by the cell count of the first-step sample.  There are 867 observations in the U.S. and 114 in the 
Norwegian second-step samples; for Great Britain, observation counts are 835 (col. 1), 782 (col. 2), 679 (col. 3), 
805 (col. 4), 757 (col. 5) and 596 (col. 6). 
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Table 4: Dynamic Wage and Unemployment Relationships—Wage or Phillips Curve? 
 
       
 Males Females 
 All Nonunion Union All Nonunion Union 
       
USA (CPS)       
Log ur,t ( 0λ ) -.0371 -.0398 -.0176 -.0231 -.0251 .0212 
 (.0073) (.0080) (.0145) (.0068) (.0071) (.0240) 
Log ur,t-1 ( 1λ− ) .0203 .0228 .0050 .0055 .0079 -.0390 
 (.0073) (.0080) (.0144) (.0068) (.0070) (.0239) 
       
P-values:       
0 0λ =  .000 .000 .227 .001 .000 .376 
0 1 0λ λ−+ = (Wage c.) .000 .000 .010 .000 .000 .032 
1 0λ− =  (Phillips c.) .005 .004 .727 .415 .263 .103 
       
Great Britain        
Log ur,t ( 0λ ) -.0736 -.1128 -.0139 -.0292 -.0329 -.0692 
 (.0532) (.0711) (.0799) (.0593) (.0743) (.1118) 
Log ur,t-1 ( 1λ− ) .0815 .1360 .0149 .0371 .0524 .0515 
 (.0583) (.0790) (.0851) (.0649) (.0816) (.1209) 
       
P-values:       
0 0λ =  .167 .113 .862 .622 .658 .536 
0 1 0λ λ−+ = (Wage c.) .593 .241 .966 .631 .350 .549 
1 0λ− =  (Phillips c.) .162 .086 .862 .568 .521 .670 
       
Norway       
Log ur,t ( 0λ ) -.0631 -.0631 -.0349 -.0502 -.1039 -.0054 
 (.0286) (.0398) (.0421) (.0442) (.0607) (.0539) 
Log ur,t-1 ( 1λ− ) .0593 .0611 .0325 .0410 .0904 -.0024 
 (.0307) (.0426) (.0450) (.0475) (.0656) (.0574) 
       
P-values:       
0 0λ =  .030 .116 .409 .259 .090 .920 
0 1 0λ λ−+ = (Wage c.) .701 .879 .874 .545 .517 .871 
1 0λ− =  (Phillips c.) .056 .154 .472 .390 .171 .967 
       
 
Notes:  Tests are based on the procedure outlined in Card (1995).  The dependent variable is the first difference of 
the state wage effects used in Table 3.  Regressions are weighted by , , 1 , , 1* /( )r t r t r t r tn n n n− −+ , where ,r tn  denotes 
the group-specific cell size of region r in the first-step regression from year t.  Sample sizes are as listed in Table 
3. 
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Table 5: Wage Curve Elasticities by Age, Gender and Union Status  
 
  
United States (CPS)
 
 
Great Britain 
 
Norway 
    
Young Males (16-29)    
Nonunion -.0858 -.2192 -.0947 
 (.0044) (.0641) (.0413) 
    
Union -.0127 .0011 -.1122 
 (.0111) (.0914) (.0380) 
    
Old Males (30-64)    
Nonunion  -.0142 -.0367 -.0468 
 (.0039) (.0479) (.0289) 
    
Union .0129 -.0885 .0041 
 (.0058) (.0563) (.0294) 
    
Young Females (16-29)    
Nonunion -.0482 .0655 -.0567 
 (.0042) (.0621) (.0653) 
    
Union .0321 -.0062 .0062 
 (.0161) (.0775) (.0620) 
    
Old Females (30-64)    
Nonunion  -.0040 -.0856 -.0097 
 (.0038) (.0554) (.0570) 
    
Union .0851 -.0346 .0152 
 (.0095) (.0779) (.0310) 
    
 
Note: See Table 2 for details.   
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Table 6: Dynamic Wage-Unemployment Relationships by Age and Union Status—Males 
 
     
 Young (16-29) Old (30-64) 
 Nonunion Union Nonunion Union 
USA (CPS)     
Static model     
Log unemployment (λ) -.0893 -.0133 -.0166 .0172 
 (.0077) (.0136) (.0061) (.0072) 
Dynamic model     
Lagged wage (ρ) .6297 .2418 .5604 .3533 
 (.0229) (.0336) (.0282) (.0328) 
Log unemployment (λ) -.0624 -.0124 -.0228 .0080 
 (.0055) (.0133) (.0049) (.0068) 
     
Long-run elasticity 
(λ/(1- ρ)) 
-.1685 -.0163 -.0518 .0123 
   Difference -.1522 -.0641 
     
Great Britain      
Static model     
Log unemployment (λ) -.2470 .0965 -.0258 -.1088 
 (.0710) (.1180) (.0506) (.0603) 
Dynamic model     
Lagged wage (ρ) -.0045 .0694 .0157 .0872 
 (.0434) (.0600) (.0415) (.0422) 
Log unemployment (λ) -.2996 .1697 -.0524 -.1190 
 (.0844) (.1419) (.0530) (.0636) 
     
Long-run elasticity 
(λ/(1- ρ)) 
-.2983 .1824 -.0533 -.1304 
   Difference -.4807 .0771 
     
Norway     
Static model     
Log unemployment (λ) -.0894 -.1053 -.0382 .0313 
 (.0483) (.0553) (.0372) (.0306) 
Dynamic model     
Lagged wage (ρ) -.0562 -.0466 -.0032 -.1334 
 (.0991) (.1051) (.0987) (.0306) 
Log unemployment (λ) -.0918 -.1123 -.0382 .0329 
 (.0487) (.0577) (.0374) (.0305) 
Long-run elasticity 
(λ/(1- ρ)) 
-.0869 -.1073 -.0381 .0290 
   Difference .0204 -.0671 
     
Note:  Methodology parallels that of Table 3. There are 867 observations in the U.S. and 114 in the Norwegian 
second-step samples; for Great Britain, observation counts are 584 (col. 1), 376 (col. 2), 704 (col. 3) and 632 (col. 
4). 
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Table 7: Dynamic Wage-Unemployment Relationships by Age and Union Status—Females 
 
     
 Young (16-29) Old (30-64) 
 Nonunion Union Nonunion Union 
USA (CPS)     
Static model     
Log unemployment (λ) -.0489 .0253 -.0051 .0832 
 (.0067) (.0177) (.0061) (.0108) 
Dynamic model     
Lagged wage (ρ) .6381 .1593 .6537 .1763 
 (.0248) (.0352) (.0255) (.0355) 
     
Log unemployment (λ) -.0410 .0163 -.0212 .0645 
 (.0050) (.0183) (.0045) (.0115) 
     
Long-run elasticity 
(λ/(1- ρ)) 
-.1133 .0194 -.0612 .0784 
   Difference -.1327 -.1396 
     
Great Britain      
Static model     
Log unemployment (λ) .0793 .1957 -.0320 .0399 
 (.0766) (.1224) (.0594) (.0891) 
Dynamic model     
Lagged wage (ρ) .0263 -.1951 .1046 .0195 
 (.0449) (.0674) (.0460) (.0550) 
Log unemployment (λ) .0115 .0595 -.0181 -.0293 
 (.0829) (.1688) (.0615) (.1003) 
     
Long-run elasticity 
(λ/(1- ρ)) 
.0119 .0498 -.0202 -.0299 
   Difference -.0379 .0097 
     
Norway     
Static model     
Log unemployment (λ) -.1192 -.0173 -.0137 .0171 
 (.0848) (-.0775) (.0573) (.0399) 
Dynamic model     
Lagged wage (ρ) -.0395 -.1304 -.2783 -.1655 
 (.1065) (??) (.1039) (.1084) 
Log unemployment (λ) -.1214 -.0084 .0039 .0208 
 (.0854) (.0789) (.0558) (.0596) 
Long-run elasticity 
(λ/(1- ρ)) 
-.1168 -.0074 .0031 .0178 
   Difference -.1094 -.0147 
     
Note:  Methodology parallels that of Table 3. There are 867 observations in the U.S. and 114 in the Norwegian 
second-step samples; for Great Britain, observation counts are 531 (col. 1), 324 (col. 2), 678 (col. 3) and 495 (col. 
4). 
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 Table A1: Log Wage Regressions, United States (CPS Samples) 
       
 Males Females 
 All Nonunion Union All Nonunion Union 
       
ln(UR) -.0277  -.0403  .0104  -.0090  -.0157  .0755  
 (.0031) (.0033) (.0054) (.0030) (.0031) (.0085) 
Union .1230    .1306    
 (.0013)   (.0018)   
Schooling .0782  .0803  .0446  .0791  .0799  .0615  
 (.0002) (.0002) (.0005) (.0003) (.0003) (.0008) 
Experience .0287  .0290  .0262  .0189  .0188  .0193  
 (.0001) (.0001) (.0003) (.0001) (.0001) (.0004) 
Experience2 -.0004  -.0004  -.0004  -.0003  -.0003  -.0003  
 (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) 
Married .1257  .1312  .0744  .0421  .0430  .0290  
 (.0010) (.0011) (.0020) (.0009) (.0009) (.0028) 
Black -.1684  -.1698  -.1405  -.0947  -.0898  -.1061  
 (.0016) (.0018) (.0030) (.0014) (.0015) (.0039) 
Hispanic -.0910  -.0917  -.0888  -.0557  -.0518  -.0683  
 (.0025) (.0027) (.0059) (.0024) (.0025) (.0071) 
SMSA .0923  .0972  .0467  .1063  .1077  .0718  
 (.0012) (.0013) (.0021) (.0012) (.0012) (.0037) 
Part-time -.2390  -.2419  -.1337  -.1592  -.1648  -.0498  
 (.0017) (.0017) (.0066) (.0010) (.0011) (.0048) 
Construction -.1241  -.1721  .0897  -.2178  -.2238  -.0456  
 (.0034) (.0038) (.0060) (.0077) (.0079) (.0360) 
Food -.2506  -.2451  -.2387  -.2616  -.2644  -.2970  
 (.0038) (.0045) (.0064) (.0075) (.0078) (.0306) 
Tobacco .0217  .0152  .0599  -.0057  -.0332  .0156  
 (.0136) (.0155) (.0246) (.0218) (.0251) (.0486) 
Textiles -.2415  -.2294  -.3530  -.2962  -.2873  -.4307  
 (.0050) (.0054) (.0111) (.0078) (.0080) (.0323) 
Apparel -.3542  -.3461  -.4253  -.4595  -.4468  -.5501  
 (.0069) (.0076) (.0147) (.0074) (.0077) (.0307) 
Paper -.1331  -.1141  -.1155  -.1998  -.1991  -.2269  
 (.0045) (.0058) (.0068) (.0087) (.0094) (.0317) 
Printing -.2061  -.2195  -.0869  -.2661  -.2682  -.2305  
 (.0043) (.0047) (.0084) (.0076) (.0078) (.0321) 
Chemicals -.0595  -.0463  -.1137  -.0898  -.0794  -.2194  
 (.0041) (.0046) (.0073) (.0080) (.0082) (.0324) 
Petroleum .0054  .0424  -.0027  -.0025  -.0054  .0222  
 (.0067) (.0085) (.0095) (.0149) (.0157) (.0470) 
Rubber -.2115  -.2100  -.2020  -.2918  -.2874  -.3452  
 (.0046) (.0053) (.0084) (.0081) (.0084) (.0317) 
Leather -.3123  -.2960  -.3978  -.3983  -.3843  -.5161  
 (.0101) (.0113) (.0212) (.0099) (.0105) (.0343) 
Lumber -.2561  -.2585  -.2443  -.2764  -.2756  -.3204  
 (.0045) (.0050) (.0088) (.0093) (.0098) (.0342) 
Furniture -.2881  -.2846  -.3244  -.2761  -.2705  -.3613  
 (.0048) (.0052) (.0103) (.0083) (.0086) (.0327) 
Stone -.2085  -.2061  -.1794  -.2333  -.2253  -.2782  
 (.0046) (.0055) (.0074) (.0092) (.0100) (.0319) 
Prim Metal -.1783  -.1494  -.1659  -.1827  -.1799  -.2101  
 (.0042) (.0053) (.0063) (.0094) (.0100) (.0334) 
Fabr Metal -.2117  -.2090  -.1875  -.2527  -.2526  -.2807  
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 (.0039) (.0044) (.0069) (.0079) (.0083) (.0312) 
Indust Metal -.1173  -.1087  -.1507  -.1450  -.1412  -.2162  
 (.0036) (.0040) (.0064) (.0075) (.0078) (.0316) 
Elect Equip -.1091  -.0947  -.1801  -.2227  -.2239  -.2418  
 (.0039) (.0044) (.0071) (.0074) (.0077) (.0305) 
Transp Equip -.0783  -.0609  -.0445  -.0919  -.1051  -.0724  
 (.0037) (.0044) (.0060) (.0079) (.0083) (.0307) 
Instruments -.0969  -.0968  -.1824  -.2115  -.2049  -.3161  
  (.0048) (.0052) (.0132) (.0081) (.0083) (.0328) 
Misc Manuf -.2619  -.2629  -.2721  -.3636  -.3571  -.4503  
   (.0058) (.0062) (.0137) (.0083) (.0086) (.0332) 
Transportation -.1975  -.2517  -.0408  -.2264  -.2542  -.1032  
 (.0036) (.0042) (.0061) (.0074) (.0077) (.0313) 
Comm -.0591  -.0511  .0013  -.0685  -.0572  -.0923  
 (.0041) (.0050) (.0066) (.0075) (.0080) (.0303) 
Utilities -.0044  .0168  .0301  -.0458  -.0371  -.0729  
 (.0039) (.0047) (.0064) (.0082) (.0087) (.0314) 
Wholesale -.2238  -.2285  -.2020  -.2533  -.2506  -.3495  
 (.0035) (.0039) (.0069) (.0072) (.0074) (.0325) 
Retail Trade -.3947  -.4041  -.3099  -.5150  -.5166  -.4888  
 (.0034) (.0037) (.0066) (.0070) (.0072) (.0303) 
Finance -.0487  -.0632  -.0993  -.2121  -.2116  -.3026  
 (.0042) (.0045) (.0232) (.0071) (.0073) (.0324) 
Insur, RE -.1750  -.1817  -.1928  -.1958  -.1944  -.2720  
 (.0042) (.0045) (.0119) (.0071) (.0074) (.0322) 
Busin Service -.2472  -.2534  -.2846  -.2773  -.2753  -.3707  
 (.0039) (.0042) (.0097) (.0071) (.0074) (.0319) 
Auto Repair -.2845  -.2965  -.1138  -.3338  -.3340  -.2508  
 (.0041) (.0044) (.0116) (.0100) (.0102) (.0534) 
House Service -.4251  -.4213  -.2613  -.6440  -.6395  -.6418  
 (.0111) (.0113) (.1342) (.0080) (.0081) (.0529) 
Personal Serv -.4684  -.4677  -.4661  -.4840  -.4791  -.5438  
 (.0045) (.0049) (.0097) (.0072) (.0074) (.0311) 
Entertainment -.3442  -.3714  -.0863  -.3965  -.4010  -.3001  
 (.0050) (.0052) (.0141) (.0080) (.0081) (.0357) 
Health Offices -.1325  -.1435  -.1502  -.2165  -.2139  -.2800  
 (.0061) (.0064) (.0283) (.0071) (.0073) (.0317) 
Hospitals -.2708  -.2731  -.2512  -.1817  -.1765  -.2068  
 (.0042) (.0045) (.0095) (.0071) (.0073) (.0304) 
Education -.3379  -.3512  -.1672  -.3684  -.3753  -.2592  
 (.0047) (.0051) (.0102) (.0073) (.0076) (.0309) 
Care -.4209  -.4309  -.3307  -.4696  -.4697  -.4432  
 (.0076) (.0079) (.0256) (.0073) (.0076) (.0331) 
Other Service -.1934  -.2112  -.0383  -.2177  -.2181  -.2078  
 (.0043) (.0046) (.0118) (.0072) (.0074) (.0323) 
Feb .0005  .0004  .0000  .0024  .0033  -.0042  
 (.0025) (.0026) (.0042) (.0023) (.0024) (.0070) 
Mar .0075  .0061  .0141  .0054  .0065  -.0060  
 (.0025) (.0026) (.0042) (.0024) (.0025) (.0070) 
Apr .0063  .0064  .0066  .0090  .0100  -.0020  
 (.0025) (.0027) (.0043) (.0023) (.0024) (.0072) 
May .0077  .0079  .0071  .0100  .0106  .0031  
 (.0025) (.0026) (.0046) (.0023) (.0024) (.0066) 
Jun .0131  .0132  .0105  .0184  .0188  .0149  
 (.0025) (.0027) (.0043) (.0025) (.0026) (.0070) 
Jul .0124  .0119  .0133  .0166  .0174  .0091  
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 (.0026) (.0027) (.0042) (.0024) (.0024) (.0069) 
Aug .0089  .0076  .0162  .0173  .0184  .0058  
 (.0025) (.0027) (.0044) (.0024) (.0025) (.0068) 
Sep .0122  .0116  .0154  .0206  .0217  .0071  
 (.0025) (.0027) (.0044) (.0024) (.0025) (.0069) 
Oct .0194  .0194  .0186  .0254  .0256  .0255  
 (.0025) (.0026) (.0043) (.0024) (.0025) (.0070) 
Nov .0210  .0213  .0178  .0240  .0244  .0223  
 (.0025) (.0027) (.0043) (.0023) (.0024) (.0068) 
Dec .0211  .0203  .0249  .0250  .0261  .0133  
 (.0024) (.0026) (.0042) (.0023) (.0024) (.0069) 
1984 .0243  .0230  .0342  .0370  .0362  .0513  
 (.0035) (.0037) (.0049) (.0035) (.0036) (.0077) 
1985 .0459  .0434  .0649  .0606  .0587  .0938  
 (.0036) (.0037) (.0050) (.0036) (.0037) (.0082) 
1986 .0654  .0622  .0934  .0844  .0822  .1224  
 (.0034) (.0037) (.0050) (.0035) (.0035) (.0082) 
1987 .0884  .0878  .1105  .1215  .1193  .1669  
 (.0034) (.0037) (.0053) (.0035) (.0036) (.0084) 
1988 .1123  .1112  .1338  .1587  .1565  .2048  
 (.0036) (.0038) (.0058) (.0037) (.0038) (.0091) 
1989 .1522  .1531  .1645  .1981  .1953  .2511  
 (.0039) (.0041) (.0061) (.0038) (.0039) (.0094) 
1990 .1914  .1957  .1874  .2505  .2499  .2761  
 (.0039) (.0041) (.0060) (.0039) (.0040) (.0095) 
1991 .2196  .2262  .2087  .2941  .2944  .3045  
 (.0037) (.0039) (.0058) (.0036) (.0037) (.0091) 
1992 .2437  .2514  .2315  .3293  .3315  .3109  
 (.0035) (.0037) (.0053) (.0035) (.0035) (.0083) 
1993 .2608  .2680  .2520  .3568  .3585  .3454  
 (.0034) (.0036) (.0052) (.0034) (.0035) (.0085) 
1994 .2728  .2804  .2583  .3775  .3796  .3615  
 (.0036) (.0038) (.0059) (.0037) (.0038) (.0090) 
1995 .3158  .3246  .2875  .4178  .4191  .4086  
 (.0042) (.0043) (.0068) (.0043) (.0044) (.0099) 
1996 .3176  .3264  .2906  .4235  .4244  .4200  
 (.0040) (.0042) (.0070) (.0039) (.0040) (.0102) 
1997 .3510  .3590  .3276  .4591  .4603  .4466  
 (.0041) (.0042) (.0071) (.0040) (.0041) (.0105) 
1998 .3984  .4093  .3517  .5065  .5080  .4893  
 (.0042) (.0044) (.0075) (.0041) (.0042) (.0115) 
1999 .4380  .4509  .3719  .5447  .5468  .5159  
 (.0044) (.0046) (.0074) (.0044) (.0045) (.0116) 
2000 .4736  .4858  .4040  .5838  .5861  .5493  
 (.0045) (.0047) (.0076) (.0046) (.0047) (.0120) 
AK .3374  .3299  .3418  .3619  .3682  .2611  
 (.0086) (.0086) (.0136) (.0079) (.0080) (.0179) 
AZ .0531  .0482  .0760  .0831  .0825  .1457  
 (.0052) (.0057) (.0142) (.0054) (.0056) (.0244) 
AR -.0344  -.0373  -.0106  -.0030  -.0010  -.0162  
 (.0048) (.0054) (.0096) (.0049) (.0051) (.0193) 
CA .1527  .1454  .1607  .2160  .2170  .1757  
 (.0042) (.0046) (.0073) (.0041) (.0043) (.0140) 
CO .0792  .0741  .0692  .1079  .1054  .1515  
 (.0055) (.0059) (.0116) (.0055) (.0056) (.0204) 
CT .1653  .1690  .0939  .2063  .2143  .0951  
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 (.0056) (.0062) (.0101) (.0059) (.0061) (.0175) 
DE .1073  .1074  .0842  .1432  .1424  .1204  
 (.0054) (.0061) (.0096) (.0054) (.0056) (.0203) 
DC .1828  .1922  .0808  .2665  .2724  .1656  
 (.0064) (.0072) (.0155) (.0059) (.0062) (.0192) 
FL -.0008  -.0006  -.0014  .0494  .0525  -.0182  
 (.0042) (.0047) (.0092) (.0042) (.0043) (.0182) 
GA .0787  .0779  .0496  .1060  .1059  .0839  
 (.0051) (.0055) (.0112) (.0050) (.0053) (.0196) 
HI .1712  .1547  .1807  .1994  .1979  .1975  
 (.0064) (.0071) (.0114) (.0062) (.0066) (.0184) 
ID .0494  .0445  .0695  .0655  .0666  .0828  
 (.0051) (.0056) (.0102) (.0050) (.0052) (.0196) 
IL .1211  .1224  .0852  .1249  .1299  .0456  
 (.0040) (.0046) (.0069) (.0041) (.0043) (.0145) 
IN .0305  .0242  .0400  .0404  .0399  .0240  
 (.0046) (.0054) (.0075) (.0050) (.0053) (.0157) 
IA .0101  .0008  .0512  .0231  .0213  .0797  
 (.0049) (.0055) (.0087) (.0050) (.0052) (.0183) 
KS .0168  .0069  .0479  .0379  .0380  .0598  
 (.0051) (.0057) (.0093) (.0054) (.0055) (.0203) 
KY .0101  .0073  .0175  .0363  .0384  -.0006  
 (.0050) (.0056) (.0089) (.0052) (.0055) (.0173) 
LA .0351  .0393  .0157  .0233  .0266  -.0120  
 (.0058) (.0063) (.0120) (.0059) (.0062) (.0237) 
ME .0118  .0122  .0151  .0878  .0906  .0533  
 (.0052) (.0058) (.0094) (.0050) (.0051) (.0202) 
MD .1327  .1331  .1041  .1755  .1747  .1667  
 (.0055) (.0060) (.0102) (.0058) (.0060) (.0179) 
MA .1445  .1503  .0695  .2002  .2035  .1431  
 (.0050) (.0053) (.0085) (.0051) (.0053) (.0156) 
MI .1010  .1025  .0904  .0934  .0955  .0447  
 (.0039) (.0045) (.0069) (.0042) (.0045) (.0143) 
MN .0978  .0864  .1086  .1341  .1323  .1277  
 (.0051) (.0057) (.0084) (.0051) (.0053) (.0160) 
MS -.0102  -.0050  -.0377  .0095  .0134  -.0573  
 (.0051) (.0056) (.0111) (.0049) (.0051) (.0189) 
MO .0182  -.0028  .0622  .0429  .0442  .0097  
 (.0051) (.0058) (.0082) (.0050) (.0052) (.0166) 
MT .0216  .0041  .0703  .0244  .0234  .0192  
 (.0059) (.0063) (.0096) (.0057) (.0058) (.0181) 
NE -.0250  -.0395  .0428  .0090  .0055  .1082  
 (.0052) (.0057) (.0104) (.0053) (.0055) (.0192) 
NV .1229  .1151  .1350  .1551  .1585  .1167  
 (.0058) (.0062) (.0104) (.0061) (.0063) (.0170) 
NH .1304  .1249  .1072  .1494  .1508  .1234  
 (.0057) (.0063) (.0129) (.0058) (.0060) (.0224) 
NJ .1733  .1882  .0918  .2033  .2174  .0738  
 (.0046) (.0051) (.0076) (.0048) (.0051) (.0148) 
NM .0031  .0030  .0245  .0365  .0384  .0303  
 (.0054) (.0060) (.0120) (.0056) (.0058) (.0210) 
NY .1126  .1240  .0592  .1706  .1858  .0579  
 (.0043) (.0048) (.0073) (.0043) (.0045) (.0141) 
NC .0414  .0361  .0607  .0657  .0649  .0701  
 (.0044) (.0048) (.0099) (.0044) (.0046) (.0190) 
ND -.0342  -.0467  .0372  -.0145  -.0140  .0149  
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 (.0060) (.0065) (.0108) (.0059) (.0061) (.0231) 
OH .0469  .0474  .0376  .0604  .0620  .0217  
 (.0040) (.0046) (.0068) (.0042) (.0043) (.0142) 
OK -.0005  -.0049  .0271  .0163  .0164  .0362  
 (.0054) (.0060) (.0105) (.0060) (.0062) (.0187) 
OR .0840  .0768  .0998  .1175  .1202  .0700  
 (.0051) (.0058) (.0089) (.0053) (.0054) (.0172) 
PA .0464  .0549  .0099  .0812  .0883  -.0038  
 (.0041) (.0046) (.0070) (.0042) (.0044) (.0140) 
RI .0751  .0767  .0310  .1251  .1278  .0712  
 (.0055) (.0061) (.0103) (.0054) (.0057) (.0171) 
SC .0386  .0356  .0615  .0412  .0423  .0195  
 (.0048) (.0052) (.0146) (.0050) (.0051) (.0250) 
SD -.0620  -.0699  -.0074  -.0050  -.0039  -.0101  
 (.0055) (.0061) (.0111) (.0054) (.0055) (.0218) 
TN -.0015  -.0005  -.0160  .0295  .0305  .0138  
 (.0049) (.0054) (.0096) (.0048) (.0051) (.0178) 
TX .0350  .0334  .0576  .0780  .0804  .0615  
 (.0044) (.0049) (.0090) (.0045) (.0047) (.0170) 
UT .0377  .0292  .0702  .0565  .0575  .0615  
 (.0053) (.0056) (.0114) (.0053) (.0055) (.0243) 
VT .0497  .0543  -.0229  .1264  .1301  .0566  
 (.0056) (.0060) (.0122) (.0054) (.0056) (.0237) 
VA .0897  .0873  .0808  .1140  .1116  .1503  
 (.0054) (.0058) (.0116) (.0052) (.0054) (.0188) 
WA .1311  .1266  .1438  .1628  .1593  .1514  
 (.0050) (.0058) (.0084) (.0051) (.0055) (.0162) 
WV -.0213  -.0332  .0089  -.0290  -.0250  -.0885  
 (.0057) (.0062) (.0088) (.0055) (.0057) (.0187) 
WI .0504  .0450  .0605  .0591  .0609  .0394  
 (.0046) (.0053) (.0076) (.0048) (.0050) (.0155) 
WY .0827  .0676  .1711  .0385  .0379  .1133  
 (.0065) (.0071) (.0106) (.0070) (.0072) (.0268) 
Constant .8692  .8625  1.377  .7127  .7096  .9806  
 (.0101) (.0109) (.0183) (.0120) (.0124) (.0412) 
       
R2 .5041 .5203 .3707 .4954 .4993 .4174 
Observations 1240202 1036713 203489 1113000 1031429 81571 
 
Note: Standard errors are calculated allowing for state-by-period clustering. Dependent variable is the log hourly 
wage. Omitted state is Alabama, industry is mining, and year is 1983. 
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Table A2: Log Wage Regressions, United States (NLSY Samples) 
       
 Males Females 
 All Nonunion Union All Nonunion Union 
       
ln(UR) -.0714  -.0832  -.0354  -.0259  -.0328  .0219  
 (.0139) (.0153) (.0272) (.0132) (.0141) (.0324) 
Union .1638    .0902    
 (.0047)   (.0056)   
Schooling .0654  .0669  .0448  .0686  .0690  .0605  
 (.0011) (.0011) (.0029) (.0012) (.0012) (.0033) 
Experience .0464  .0427  .0643  .0204  .0192  .0304  
 (.0020) (.0022) (.0045) (.0020) (.0021) (.0055) 
Experience2 -.0005  -.0003  -.0018  .0005  .0006  -.0005  
 (.0001) (.0001) (.0002) (.0001) (.0001) (.0003) 
Tenure .0543  .0536  .0519  .0554  .0538  .0602  
 (.0016) (.0017) (.0035) (.0017) (.0018) (.0046) 
Tenure2 -.0026  -.0025  -.0025  -.0028  -.0028  -.0027  
 (.0001) (.0001) (.0002) (.0001) (.0001) (.0003) 
Black -.1470  -.1511  -.1161  -.0904  -.0914  -.0627  
 (.0054) (.0062) (.0104) (.0049) (.0053) (.0133) 
Hispanic -.0730  -.0726  -.0748  -.0051  -.0074  .0027  
 (.0067) (.0076) (.0128) (.0063) (.0066) (.0158) 
SMSA .0957  .0906  .1043  .0997  .1043  .0715  
 (.0051) (.0057) (.0110) (.0054) (.0057) (.0155) 
Part-time -.0397  -.0451  -.0183  -.0156  -.0206  .0185  
 (.0069) (.0078) (.0145) (.0051) (.0055) (.0131) 
Construction .0923  .1008  .0299  .1586  .1073  .2789  
 (.0170) (.0181) (.0445) (.0338) (.0359) (.0782) 
Food -.1319  -.0974  -.2759  -.0460  -.0607  -.1064  
 (.0108) (.0132) (.0189) (.0186) (.0193) (.0585) 
Tobacco -.1109  -.0729  -.1977  -.1583  -.2836  .2179  
 (.0446) (.0562) (.0300) (.0855) (.0775) (.2001) 
Textiles -.1547  -.1151  -.3489  -.1132  -.0857  -.3656  
 (.0141) (.0152) (.0356) (.0201) (.0207) (.0659) 
Apparel -.2702  -.2209  -.5425  -.1816  -.1460  -.3789  
 (.0177) (.0201) (.0357) (.0184) (.0199) (.0565) 
Paper -.0913  -.0549  -.2123  .0493  -.0028  .0601  
 (.0156) (.0204) (.0257) (.0308) (.0347) (.0650) 
Printing -.1319  -.1095  -.2161  -.0662  -.0704  -.0188  
 (.0141) (.0157) (.0295) (.0206) (.0213) (.0720) 
Chemicals -.0393  .0034  -.2  .0293  .0403  -.0888  
 (.0150) (.0167) (.0319) (.0217) (.0235) (.0652) 
Petroleum .0051  -.0060  .0527  .1503  .1480  .1693  
 (.0341) (.0385) (.0734) (.0554) (.0597) (.1609) 
Rubber -.1434  -.1203  -.2411  -.0423  -.0497  -.0770  
 (.0160) (.0193) (.0297) (.0255) (.0262) (.0858) 
Leather -.1752  -.1139  -.4357  -.1286  -.1338  -.1484  
 (.0265) (.0290) (.0603) (.0282) (.0303) (.0850) 
Lumber -.2451  -.2037  -.4391  -.0666  -.0648  -.0155  
 (.0118) (.0128) (.0302) (.0299) (.0314) (.0995) 
Furniture -.2238  -.1847  -.3871  -.0810  -.0404  -.3622  
 (.0165) (.0189) (.0318) (.0224) (.0243) (.0683) 
Stone -.1539  -.1164  -.2580  -.0168  -.0270  -.0972  
 (.0143) (.0155) (.0321) (.0275) (.0308) (.0713) 
Prim Metal -.0134  -.0001  -.1295  -.0125  -.0590  -.0284  
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 (.0135) (.0195) (.0209) (.0322) (.0339) (.0757) 
Fabr Metal -.1383  -.1024  -.2859  -.0115  .0005  -.1568  
 (.0131) (.0145) (.0277) (.0249) (.0271) (.0737) 
Indust Metal -.0297  .0164  -.2212  .0492  .0639  -.0936  
 (.0103) (.0117) (.0209) (.0198) (.0209) (.0599) 
Elect Equip -.0423  .0127  -.2889  -.0149  -.0075  -.0988  
 (.0130) (.0142) (.0281) (.0189) (.0201) (.0601) 
Transp Equip .0041  .0313  -.0968  .0905  .0598  .1101  
 (.0099) (.0121) (.0181) (.0218) (.0241) (.0622) 
Instruments .0163  .0526  -.1586  .1013  .1329  -.1643  
  (.0217) (.0238) (.0510) (.0268) (.0287) (.0688) 
Misc Manuf -.1223  -.0893  -.2513  -.0733  -.0700  -.1293  
   (.0141) (.0155) (.0332) (.0223) (.0231) (.0809) 
Transportation -.0659  -.0555  -.1092  -.0039  -.0324  .0090  
 (.0105) (.0117) (.0214) (.0190) (.0198) (.0618) 
Comm -.0750  -.0144  -.2535  .0762  .0733  .0267  
 (.0157) (.0183) (.0251) (.0201) (.0244) (.0570) 
Utilities .0175  .0206  -.0434  .1135  .1282  .0345  
 (.0127) (.0194) (.0180) (.0229) (.0274) (.0605) 
Wholesale -.1848  -.1609  -.2793  -.0825  -.0718  -.2084  
 (.0091) (.0103) (.0211) (.0180) (.0186) (.0608) 
Retail Trade -.3261  -.2983  -.4265  -.2391  -.2301  -.3469  
 (.0064) (.0069) (.0163) (.0155) (.0160) (.0547) 
Finance -.0176  .0177  -.2216  -.0691  -.0515  -.3029  
 (.0167) (.0178) (.0442) (.0164) (.0171) (.0659) 
Insur, RE -.0757  -.0395  -.2886  .0058  .0177  -.1632  
 (.0141) (.0147) (.0400) (.0168) (.0174) (.0567) 
Busin Service -.1921  -.1502  -.3983  -.0500  -.0361  -.2306  
 (.0095) (.0102) (.0249) (.0169) (.0175) (.0584) 
Auto Repair -.2032  -.1694  -.3643  -.1518  -.1338  -.2961  
 (.0103) (.0111) (.0307) (.0258) (.0275) (.0900) 
House Service -.2880  -.2664  1.2482  -.6249  -.6133  -.4985  
 (.0531) (.0518) (.0452) (.0286) (.0290) (.1917) 
Personal Serv -.3838  -.3445  -.5521  -.2122  -.2030  -.2990  
 (.0133) (.0146) (.0301) (.0179) (.0186) (.0603) 
Entertainment -.2957  -.2899  -.2467  -.1407  -.1319  -.2069  
 (.0204) (.0219) (.0585) (.0243) (.0266) (.0659) 
Health Offices -.0267  -.0008  -.1119  -.0202  -.0058  -.1850  
 (.0340) (.0368) (.1017) (.0167) (.0174) (.0622) 
Hospitals -.2704  -.2050  -.5167  -.0497  -.0253  -.2405  
 (.0135) (.0151) (.0259) (.0159) (.0166) (.0554) 
Education -.2956  -.2530  -.4245  -.2876  -.2885  -.3128  
 (.0238) (.0257) (.0586) (.0179) (.0187) (.0603) 
Care -.2670  -.2309  -.4189  -.1229  -.1173  -.1186  
 (.0399) (.0397) (.1458) (.0350) (.0365) (.0783) 
Other Service -.0655  -.0373  -.2152  .0291  .0395  -.1510  
 (.0142) (.0151) (.0406) (.0177) (.0180) (.0705) 
Feb .0030  .0039  .0128  .0200  .0195  .0116  
 (.0102) (.0109) (.0194) (.0094) (.0102) (.0216) 
Mar .0163  .0172  .0232  .0258  .0251  .0155  
 (.0104) (.0113) (.0196) (.0099) (.0107) (.0207) 
Apr .0575  .0619  .0463  .0504  .0512  .0408  
 (.0116) (.0126) (.0240) (.0113) (.0121) (.0250) 
May .0572  .0576  .0618  .0715  .0737  .0427  
 (.0126) (.0139) (.0248) (.0129) (.0140) (.0299) 
Jun .0658  .0628  .0791  .0619  .0584  .0765  
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 (.0137) (.0150) (.0284) (.0146) (.0157) (.0335) 
Jul .0865  .0844  .0976  .0838  .0816  .0802  
 (.0145) (.0160) (.0291) (.0150) (.0161) (.0356) 
Aug .1065  .1046  .1195  .0926  .0832  .1470  
 (.0148) (.0162) (.0299) (.0155) (.0166) (.0372) 
Sep .1031  .0977  .1263  .1041  .0954  .1554  
 (.0155) (.0171) (.0319) (.0166) (.0178) (.0442) 
Oct .1336  .1425  .0873  .1082  .0978  .1606  
 (.0174) (.0188) (.0346) (.0187) (.0201) (.0469) 
Nov .1390  .1490  .1105  .1277  .1133  .1921  
 (.0195) (.0216) (.0413) (.0223) (.0242) (.0513) 
Dec .1260  .1209  .1292  .0563  .0316  .2485  
 (.0304) (.0337) (.0557) (.0342) (.0363) (.1200) 
1980 .0640  .0900  -.0118  .0672  .0639  .0831  
 (.0153) (.0171) (.0336) (.0171) (.0184) (.0349) 
1981 .1246  .1501  .0494  .1458  .1454  .1403  
 (.0150) (.0161) (.0344) (.0156) (.0173) (.0337) 
1982 .1592  .1800  .1000  .1846  .1870  .1569  
 (.0149) (.0158) (.0340) (.0154) (.0170) (.0340) 
1983 .1466  .1704  .0880  .2060  .2106  .1809  
 (.0171) (.0181) (.0370) (.0171) (.0188) (.0371) 
1984 .1580  .1824  .0964  .2279  .2310  .2184  
 (.0151) (.0158) (.0345) (.0161) (.0174) (.0383) 
1985 .1775  .2039  .1050  .2649  .2658  .2659  
 (.0139) (.0148) (.0322) (.0147) (.0159) (.0361) 
1986 .1923  .2226  .1012  .2807  .2816  .2902  
 (.0140) (.0150) (.0332) (.0147) (.0159) (.0360) 
1987 .1894  .2293  .0669  .2935  .3005  .2599  
 (.0148) (.0162) (.0355) (.0162) (.0176) (.0382) 
1988 .1890  .2199  .1004  .3286  .3413  .2456  
 (.0173) (.0187) (.0394) (.0184) (.0199) (.0459) 
1989 .2084  .2434  .0961  .3700  .3774  .3195  
 (.0173) (.0189) (.0370) (.0185) (.0198) (.0461) 
1990 .2254  .2610  .1066  .3737  .3868  .2781  
 (.0178) (.0192) (.0400) (.0192) (.0206) (.0487) 
1991 .2518  .2891  .1320  .4388  .4512  .3427  
 (.0184) (.0200) (.0396) (.0192) (.0207) (.0462) 
1992 .2593  .2936  .1647  .4236  .4335  .3511  
 (.0186) (.0197) (.0426) (.0192) (.0206) (.0493) 
1993 .2884  .3273  .1671  .4502  .4608  .3712  
 (.0183) (.0202) (.0408) (.0197) (.0212) (.0478) 
1994 .2898  .3140  .2336  .4604  .4661  .4141  
 (.0195) (.0212) (.0424) (.0199) (.0215) (.0500) 
1996 .3133  .3411  .2524  .4857  .4811  .5273  
 (.0185) (.0198) (.0406) (.0188) (.0202) (.0484) 
1998 .3775  .3936  .3700  .5341  .5336  .5388  
 (.0189) (.0203) (.0436) (.0186) (.0200) (.0462) 
AK .3703  .3325  .4663  .4455  .4420  .5162  
 (.0249) (.0293) (.0608) (.0345) (.0318) (.1748) 
AZ -.0090  -.0186  .0318  .0550  .0580  .0848  
 (.0185) (.0205) (.0424) (.0177) (.0191) (.0404) 
AR -.0170  -.0200  -.0761  -.0265  -.0033  -.1494  
 (.0209) (.0227) (.0517) (.0180) (.0208) (.0384) 
CA .1949  .1781  .2577  .1942  .1980  .1858  
 (.0115) (.0133) (.0274) (.0125) (.0133) (.0302) 
CO .0871  .0720  .1604  .0813  .0619  .2297  
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 (.0170) (.0185) (.0361) (.0177) (.0180) (.0472) 
CT .1592  .1502  .1800  .2387  .2432  .2293  
 (.0176) (.0188) (.0379) (.0192) (.0197) (.0497) 
DE .0444  .0417  .1589  .1024  .0953  .0503  
 (.0598) (.0626) (.0547) (.0792) (.0833) (.0810) 
DC .1511  .1707  .0711  .1990  .1964  .2114  
 (.0232) (.0262) (.0437) (.0224) (.0237) (.0491) 
FL .0599  .0685  -.0313  .0634  .0716  -.0193  
 (.0135) (.0150) (.0329) (.0128) (.0136) (.0345) 
GA .0370  .0436  .0086  .0913  .1085  -.0250  
 (.0130) (.0147) (.0277) (.0146) (.0156) (.0345) 
HI .2257  .2206  .3118  .1143  .1262  .0873  
 (.0698) (.0840) (.0856) (.0824) (.0969) (.1544) 
ID .1960  .1983  .0963  .0661  .0449  .2564  
 (.0535) (.0469) (.2362) (.0627) (.0722) (.1211) 
IL .1472  .1266  .2046  .1315  .1384  .0991  
 (.0129) (.0151) (.0279) (.0133) (.0152) (.0341) 
IN .0658  .0440  .1223  -.0079  -.0001  -.0657  
 (.0193) (.0215) (.0375) (.0190) (.0200) (.0530) 
IA -.0372  -.0687  .0808  -.0126  -.0267  .1065  
 (.0243) (.0268) (.0557) (.0205) (.0231) (.0677) 
KS .0334  -.0009  .1606  -.0747  -.0934  .1256  
 (.0258) (.0308) (.0410) (.0259) (.0280) (.1101) 
KY .0367  .0419  -.0064  -.0383  -.0413  -.0050  
 (.0466) (.0505) (.0825) (.0368) (.0391) (.0809) 
LA .0793  .0855  .0510  .0514  .0622  -.0911  
 (.0260) (.0280) (.0674) (.0209) (.0220) (.0720) 
ME -.1206  -.0764  -.2691  .0114  .0079  .1464  
 (.0807) (.0919) (.0562) (.0488) (.0508) (.0404) 
MD .0767  .0851  .0124  .1386  .1578  .0223  
 (.0193) (.0208) (.0432) (.0195) (.0218) (.0424) 
MA .1411  .1151  .2589  .1430  .1509  .1133  
 (.0199) (.0217) (.0446) (.0188) (.0202) (.0400) 
MI .0516  .0397  .1097  .0296  .0253  .0599  
 (.0124) (.0142) (.0301) (.0132) (.0144) (.0298) 
MN -.0043  -.0296  .1276  .0674  .0627  .0977  
 (.0150) (.0162) (.0357) (.0180) (.0191) (.0561) 
MS -.0681  -.0542  -.1245  -.0571  -.0440  -.0629  
 (.0191) (.0213) (.0456) (.0182) (.0184) (.0629) 
MO -.0575  -.0813  .0223  .0454  .0597  -.0641  
 (.0145) (.0179) (.0320) (.0155) (.0163) (.0403) 
MT .0155  .0072  .0501  -.0652  -.1085  .1240  
 (.0226) (.0283) (.0533) (.0337) (.0345) (.0730) 
NE -.0473  -.0539  -.0474  -.1139  -.1193  -.0874  
 (.0397) (.0414) (.1296) (.0341) (.0332) (.1549) 
NV .1910  .1728  .3204  .0947  .1093  -.0479  
 (.0296) (.0329) (.0792) (.0282) (.0310) (.0606) 
NH .0349  .0312  -.0235  -.0484  -.0506  .  
 (.0580) (.0638) (.0938) (.0483) (.0487) (.) 
NJ .1808  .1747  .2063  .2078  .2180  .0382  
 (.0168) (.0200) (.0286) (.0171) (.0177) (3.650) 
NM -.0203  -.0355  .0521  -.0295  -.0513  .0557  
 (.0215) (.0221) (.0553) (.0216) (.0243) (1.960) 
NY .1391  .1366  .1570  .1441  .1566  .0316  
 (.0141) (.0157) (.0274) (.0146) (.0163) (2.960) 
NC .0178  .0062  .0878  .0528  .0527  .0439  
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 (.0132) (.0151) (.0369) (.0149) (.0154) (.6000) 
ND .1611  .1854  -.3069  -.0221  -.0194  .  
 (.0649) (.0628) (.0545) (.0668) (.0678) (.) 
OH .0009  .0004  .0239  -.0019  .0015  -.5500  
 (.0123) (.0138) (.0264) (.0127) (.0134) (.5840) 
OK .0367  .0408  .0344  .0242  .0194  .7200  
 (.0177) (.0192) (.0443) (.0182) (.0210) (.4720) 
OR .1270  .1060  .2544  .0567  .0723  -2.410  
 (.0250) (.0284) (.0561) (.0310) (.0303) (.0160) 
PA .0236  .0250  .0316  .0469  .0498  1.81  
 (.0124) (.0147) (.0275) (.0125) (.0136) (.0700) 
RI .2403  .3398  -.3277  .2199  .2206  .  
 (.1091) (.1114) (.1486) (.0772) (.0777) (.) 
SC .0236  .0328  -.0530  .0203  .0301  .3010  
 (.0156) (.0176) (.0340) (.0149) (.0161) (-.1451) 
SD -.0940  -.0787  -.0879  -.0441  -.0405  .5550  
 (.0315) (.0313) (.0750) (.0316) (.0343) (-.2883) 
TN -.0364  -.0412  .0002  .0288  .0259  .1020  
 (.0148) (.0160) (.0451) (.0140) (.0150) (-.0128) 
TX .0352  .0328  .0359  .0490  .0559  .7400  
 (.0127) (.0139) (.0295) (.0129) (.0136) (-.0596) 
UT .1112  .1453  -.1065  .0900  .0678  .0020  
 (.0466) (.0444) (.1485) (.0390) (.0392) (.0827) 
VT -.0502  -.0459  -.0977  .0662  .0642  .0750  
 (.0254) (.0264) (.1286) (.0278) (.0286) (-.0251) 
VA -.0092  .0115  -.0849  -.0192  -.0109  .0520  
 (.0147) (.0171) (.0313) (.0156) (.0169) (-.1582) 
WA .1199  .0940  .1995  .0661  .0506  .0000  
 (.0169) (.0194) (.0332) (.0200) (.0211) (.0778) 
WV .0528  .0190  .2211  -.0070  .0055  .1710  
 (.0203) (.0213) (.0513) (.0201) (.0218) (-.1777) 
WI .0031  -.0094  .0681  -.0179  -.0315  .0210  
 (.0143) (.0170) (.0297) (.0152) (.0158) (.0140) 
WY .1484  .1355  .3168  .1264  .1410  .  
 (.0749) (.0821) (.0588) (.0811) (.0805) (.) 
Constant .7201  .6882  1.1693  .3318  .3263  .3672  
 (.0341) (.0370) (.0759) (.0380) (.0412) (.7588) 
       
R2 .5675 .5679 .5698 .5830 .5881 .5888 
Observations 47330 38141 9189 41880 36775 5105 
 
Note: Standard errors are calculated allowing for state-by-period clustering. Dependent variable is the log hourly 
wage. Omitted state is Alabama, industry is mining, and year is 1979. 
 
 
 
 51
Table A3: Log Wage Regressions, Great Britain 
       
 Males Females 
 All Nonunion Union All Nonunion Union 
       
lurate -.1010  -.1056  -.0747  -.0177  -.0033  -.0102  
 (.0294) (.0390) (.0523) (.0316) (.0400) (.0563) 
d_un .0503    .0651    
 (.0086)   (.0095)   
age .0705  .0787  .0569  .0527  .0490  .0659  
 (.0022) (.0031) (.0037) (.0024) (.0029) (.0051) 
sqrage -.0008  -.0009  -.0006  -.0006  -.0006  -.0008  
 (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0001) 
d_mrdv .1376  .1156  .1603  .0491  .0623  -.0032  
 (.0103) (.0129) (.0176) (.0116) (.0140) (.0219) 
d_ptime -.0470  -.0267  -.0681  -.1171  -.1007  -.1218  
 (.0331) (.0381) (.0934) (.0130) (.0154) (.0280) 
othqual .0097  .0888  -.0795  .1890  .2182  .0353  
 (.0376) (.0538) (.0527) (.0420) (.0698) (.0458) 
apprent .1312  .1250  .1052  .1346  .1817  .0487  
 (.0214) (.0327) (.0318) (.0657) (.0773) (.1564) 
cse .1567  .2039  .1100  .0995  .0583  .1643  
 (.0167) (.0231) (.0265) (.0222) (.0264) (.0378) 
commql .1967  .3051  -.1229  .1184  .1241  .0832  
 (.1415) (.2124) (.1704) (.0177) (.0212) (.0323) 
o_level .1847  .2269  .1357  .1856  .1781  .1712  
 (.0128) (.0194) (.0188) (.0127) (.0159) (.0253) 
a_level .2733  .3301  .2067  .2598  .2275  .2871  
 (.0135) (.0191) (.0198) (.0163) (.0201) (.0326) 
nursql .2873  .3210  .0556  .3357  .3336  .3136  
 (.0871) (.0940) (.0469) (.0357) (.0430) (.0642) 
highql .3274  .3629  .2756  .2454  .2535  .1981  
 (.0135) (.0194) (.0183) (.0170) (.0197) (.0316) 
teachql .2933  .2847  .3379  .3093  .3222  .2939  
 (.0533) (.0721) (.0781) (.0478) (.0596) (.1173) 
firstdg .5304  .5669  .4602  .5142  .5020  .5029  
 (.0174) (.0241) (.0293) (.0218) (.0267) (.0481) 
highdeg .6228  .6387  .5829  .7093  .7849  .4705  
 (.0351) (.0430) (.0634) (.0839) (.0947) (.1792) 
d_sic2 -.0184  -.0451  -.0202  -.0034  .0261  -.0616  
 (.0214) (.0363) (.0275) (.0355) (.0567) (.0477) 
d_sic3 -.0463  -.0030  -.0976  -.0111  .0564  -.1457  
 (.0187) (.0323) (.0227) (.0312) (.0478) (.0472) 
d_sic4 -.0950  -.0596  -.1312  -.1069  -.0375  -.2154  
 (.0195) (.0319) (.0245) (.0292) (.0463) (.0405) 
d_sic5 -.0328  .0035  -.1013  .0035  .0717  -.3197  
 (.0226) (.0330) (.0396) (.0522) (.0656) (.1054) 
d_sic6 -.1719  -.1302  -.2387  -.2033  -.1302  -.3640  
 (.0198) (.0312) (.0273) (.0285) (.0460) (.0398) 
d_sic7 -.1186  -.1189  -.1424  -.0079  -.0137  -.0444  
 (.0232) (.0412) (.0252) (.0352) (.0542) (.0472) 
d_sic8 .0797  .1092  .0286  .0677  .1139  -.0169  
 (.0200) (.0334) (.0261) (.0278) (.0455) (.0384) 
d_sic9 -.1569  -.1067  -.2403  -.2096  -.1758  -.1707  
 (.0269) (.0387) (.0396) (.0307) (.0486) (.0470) 
d_size2 -.0237  -.0576  -.0374  -.0527  -.0178  -.1479  
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 (.0435) (.0541) (.0696) (.0379) (.0423) (.0858) 
d_size3 .0622  .0695  .0104  .0931  .1077  .0490  
 (.0123) (.0146) (.0233) (.0129) (.0152) (.0284) 
d_size4 .1324  .1693  .0072  .1344  .1659  .0393  
 (.0136) (.0173) (.0211) (.0136) (.0176) (.0264) 
d_size5 .1299  .1657  .0199  .1491  .1798  .0569  
 (.0125) (.0169) (.0207) (.0148) (.0197) (.0259) 
d_size6 .1348  .1751  .0479  .1825  .2258  .1063  
 (.0123) (.0159) (.0198) (.0133) (.0179) (.0254) 
d_size7 .2076  .2359  .1279  .1724  .2044  .1250  
 (.0164) (.0266) (.0229) (.0186) (.0284) (.0305) 
d_size8 .2613  .2973  .1771  .2067  .1798  .1692  
 (.0149) (.0224) (.0222) (.0187) (.0329) (.0293) 
d_sicms .0111  -.0835  .1452  -.0658  -.0168  -.1390  
 (.0851) (.1214) (.0878) (.0957) (.1241) (.1818) 
adhimis .2944  .3041  .1761  .1127  .1298  .0269  
 (.0348) (.0400) (.0926) (.0591) (.0703) (.0924) 
d_sizems -.0569  -.2602  .2090  -.1215  -.1969  -.0108  
 (.1344) (.1446) (.1429) (.1104) (.0728) (.2608) 
wave2 .0397  .0326  .0485  .0482  .0457  .0506  
 (.0120) (.0157) (.0183) (.0125) (.0158) (.0206) 
wave3 .0432  .0246  .0665  .0631  .0655  .0600  
 (.0115) (.0167) (.0179) (.0130) (.0167) (.0199) 
wave4 .0589  .0356  .0989  .0790  .0914  .0569  
 (.0103) (.0141) (.0169) (.0113) (.0149) (.0186) 
wave5 .0653  .0439  .1048  .1182  .1255  .1202  
 (.0130) (.0151) (.0201) (.0112) (.0138) (.0201) 
wave6 .0940  .0719  .1379  .1439  .1606  .1351  
 (.0121) (.0164) (.0186) (.0123) (.0157) (.0232) 
wave7 .0723  .0596  .1093  .1895  .2182  .1542  
 (.0208) (.0260) (.0376) (.0222) (.0281) (.0385) 
_cons -.3551  -.5911  .5350  .2630  .2860  .0160  
 (.1865) (.1443) (.2338) (.1413) (.1846) (.2952) 
       
R2 .4795 .5089 .4626 .4241 .4318 .4662 
Observations 11829 7248 4581 9280 6541 2739 
 
Note: Regressions also include 216 indicator variables for travel-to-work area (TTWA). Standard errors are 
calculated allowing for TTWA-by-year clustering. Dependent variable is the log hourly wage. 
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Table A4: Log Wage Regressions, Norway 
       
 Males Females 
 All Nonunion Union All Nonunion Union 
       
logunemp -.0466  -.0660  -.0169  -.0159  -.0453  .0097  
 (.0177) (.0242) (.0262) (.0229) (.0343) (.0268) 
union -.0162    .0398    
 (.0035)   (.0043)   
school .0635  .0677  .0549  .0627  .0708  .0528  
 (.0007) (.0009) (.0009) (.0013) (.0022) (.0014) 
exp .0303  .0369  .0211  .0245  .0304  .0165  
 (.0008) (.0008) (.0007) (.0008) (.0011) (.0006) 
expsq -.0005  -.0006  -.0003  -.0004  -.0005  -.0002  
 (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) 
senior .0041  .0076  .0019  .0076  .0114  .0049  
 (.0003) (.0004) (.0004) (.0004) (.0006) (.0004) 
ind_c .3218  .3053  .3528  .3247  .3073  .3567  
 (.0253) (.0212) (.0330) (.0192) (.0220) (.0245) 
ind_da .0929  .0903  .1043  -.0017  -.0133  .0202  
 (.0072) (.0104) (.0102) (.0096) (.0165) (.0124) 
ind_db -.0299  -.0328  -.0214  -.0781  -.0217  -.1066  
 (.0174) (.0260) (.0198) (.0171) (.0273) (.0185) 
ind_dc -.0927  -.0865  -.1090  -.0362  .0073  -.0716  
 (.0435) (.0584) (.0556) (.0512) (.0680) (.0678) 
ind_dd -.0029  .0076  -.0072  .0019  .0233  -.0119  
 (.0121) (.0160) (.0136) (.0286) (.0451) (.0355) 
ind_de .1794  .1287  .2237  .1318  .0981  .1799  
 (.0074) (.0146) (.0099) (.0101) (.0142) (.0156) 
ind_df .3575  .3194  .3789  .3323  .2676  .3670  
 (.0223) (.0326) (.0274) (.0476) (.0939) (.0568) 
ind_dg .2254  .2504  .2396  .1640  .1389  .1996  
 (.0149) (.0204) (.0178) (.0162) (.0254) (.0210) 
ind_dh .0207  .0359  .0159  .0624  .0999  .0380  
 (.0148) (.0205) (.0200) (.0200) (.0265) (.0286) 
ind_di .0607  .0747  .0644  .0438  .0443  .0595  
 (.0122) (.0181) (.0151) (.0282) (.0422) (.0280) 
ind_dj .1354  .1299  .1515  .1334  .0775  .1676  
 (.0087) (.0123) (.0112) (.0180) (.0302) (.0212) 
ind_dk .1442  .1680  .1361  .1255  .1170  .1393  
 (.0108) (.0145) (.0130) (.0190) (.0247) (.0288) 
ind_dl .1526  .1469  .1725  .0947  .0994  .0998  
 (.0112) (.0157) (.0126) (.0156) (.0239) (.0183) 
ind_dm .1305  .1422  .1291  .1641  .1544  .1746  
 (.0105) (.0144) (.0127) (.0182) (.0300) (.0213) 
ind_dn -.0152  .0082  -.0331  .0460  .0253  .0649  
 (.0123) (.0176) (.0151) (.0166) (.0273) (.0213) 
ind_e .1222  .1161  .1437  .0870  .1213  .1041  
 (.0095) (.0234) (.0101) (.0162) (.0571) (.0152) 
ind_f .0240  .0071  .0627  .0366  .0300  .0556  
 (.0066) (.0071) (.0108) (.0139) (.0153) (.0352) 
ind_h -.2138  -.2069  -.1957  -.0477  -.0382  -.0453  
 (.0160) (.0173) (.0287) (.0111) (.0119) (.0161) 
ind_i .0570  .0515  .0838  .0955  .0956  .1185  
 (.0091) (.0088) (.0147) (.0081) (.0119) (.0135) 
ind_j .2017  .3056  .1857  .1886  .2516  .2131  
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 (.0078) (.0091) (.0146) (.0081) (.0161) (.0119) 
ind_k .0992  .0883  .1368  .0903  .0750  .1208  
 (.0073) (.0074) (.0111) (.0094) (.0101) (.0147) 
ind_l .0295  .0064  .0831  .0372  -.1203  .1101  
 (.0457) (.0726) (.0364) (.0326) (.0726) (.0352) 
ind_m -.0646  -.0813  -.0011  -.0253  -.0934  .0538  
 (.0107) (.0150) (.0130) (.0135) (.0220) (.0159) 
ind_n -.0360  -.0099  -.0335  .0172  -.0153  .0595  
 (.0129) (.0184) (.0140) (.0099) (.0123) (.0122) 
ind_o -.0519  -.0822  .0196  -.0593  -.0995  .0309  
 (.0113) (.0131) (.0129) (.0125) (.0150) (.0138) 
ind_x .0180  -.0182  .2664  .0480  .0386  .1070  
 (.0766) (.0805) (.1681) (.0518) (.0627) (.0666) 
year1992 .0496  .0564  .0417  .0330  .0429  .0263  
 (.0054) (.0063) (.0082) (.0066) (.0091) (.0077) 
year1993 .0935  .0968  .0904  .0875  .0969  .0816  
 (.0056) (.0067) (.0083) (.0061) (.0089) (.0067) 
year1994 .1286  .1308  .1306  .1212  .1297  .1157  
 (.0053) (.0058) (.0082) (.0064) (.0084) (.0074) 
year1995 .1729  .1676  .1823  .1553  .1530  .1609  
 (.0045) (.0051) (.0077) (.0064) (.0096) (.0058) 
year1996 .2132  .2089  .2226  .2044  .1997  .2136  
 (.0049) (.0066) (.0074) (.0072) (.0119) (.0083) 
year1997 .2710  .2605  .2920  .2606  .2545  .2747  
 (.0093) (.0104) (.0129) (.0132) (.0177) (.0142) 
regio_1 -.1366  -.1473  -.1199  -.1581  -.1945  -.1148  
 (.0045) (.0055) (.0064) (.0073) (.0085) (.0076) 
regio_2 -.0367  -.0593  .0045  -.0613  -.0634  -.0533  
 (.0103) (.0135) (.0148) (.0120) (.0174) (.0152) 
regio_4 -.1928  -.2101  -.1660  -.1998  -.2474  -.1504  
 (.0054) (.0100) (.0112) (.0074) (.0101) (.0121) 
regio_5 -.1940  -.2129  -.1617  -.1907  -.2278  -.1455  
 (.0068) (.0081) (.0103) (.0083) (.0128) (.0121) 
regio_6 -.1102  -.1116  -.0984  -.1236  -.1332  -.1006  
 (.0061) (.0109) (.0113) (.0113) (.0149) (.0118) 
regio_7 -.1254  -.1293  -.1126  -.1653  -.1799  -.1351  
 (.0075) (.0088) (.0100) (.0067) (.0100) (.0069) 
regio_8 -.1211  -.1417  -.0954  -.1673  -.2010  -.1260  
 (.0066) (.0099) (.0099) (.0099) (.0160) (.0085) 
regio_9 -.1776  -.1945  -.1462  -.1717  -.1894  -.1275  
 (.0068) (.0089) (.0156) (.0164) (.0215) (.0151) 
regio_10 -.1194  -.1201  -.1108  -.1993  -.2218  -.1601  
 (.0066) (.0099) (.0107) (.0113) (.0087) (.0181) 
regio_11 -.0229  -.0413  .0052  -.0968  -.1114  -.0705  
 (.0094) (.0078) (.0147) (.0086) (.0105) (.0116) 
regio_12 -.0865  -.0998  -.0633  -.1351  -.1577  -.0957  
 (.0042) (.0061) (.0072) (.0062) (.0082) (.0088) 
regio_14 -.1864  -.2254  -.1389  -.1910  -.2413  -.1300  
 (.0133) (.0196) (.0196) (.0167) (.0275) (.0234) 
regio_15 -.1530  -.1806  -.1164  -.1929  -.2332  -.1425  
 (.0077) (.0085) (.0107) (.0084) (.0121) (.0099) 
regio_16 -.1514  -.1553  -.1385  -.1398  -.1402  -.1219  
 (.0054) (.0073) (.0078) (.0068) (.0158) (.0085) 
regio_17 -.2119  -.2507  -.1716  -.2222  -.2726  -.1691  
 (.0073) (.0114) (.0088) (.0082) (.0145) (.0075) 
regio_18 -.1643  -.1834  -.1372  -.1755  -.1790  -.1543  
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 (.0053) (.0094) (.0080) (.0106) (.0211) (.0074) 
regio_19 -.1797  -.1970  -.1541  -.1621  -.1786  -.1326  
 (.0076) (.0098) (.0110) (.0086) (.0091) (.0124) 
regio_20 -.2078  -.2161  -.1890  -.1468  -.1222  -.1488  
 (.0121) (.0092) (.0178) (.0103) (.0239) (.0078) 
_cons 4.2312  4.1796  4.2694  4.0806  4.0659  4.1453  
 (.0317) (.0413) (.0478) (.0396) (.0598) (.0451) 
       
R2 .3685 .3743 .3884 .3436 .3349 .3600 
Observations 77537 39300 38237 34126 17138 16988 
 
Note: Standard errors are calculated allowing for region-by-year clustering. Dependent variable is the log hourly 
wage. 
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Figure 1.  The separation and wage curve elasticities.  
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